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SOCIOLOGY

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COLLECTIVE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The crowd moved through the streets, occasionally singing and chanting, as it moved toward the Federal Building in East St. Louis, Illinois, on a sunny day late in the winter of 1992. When the people reached the building and filed past, one protester pointed out to others the door she had chained herself to the previous weekend. "We thought they would arrest us," she explained, "but they didn't. By the next morning, it got kind of bad when we had to go to the bathroom." Despite the joking, the crowd was deadly serious in its purpose: to protest the deportation of Haitian refugees who had fled to the United States to escape Haiti's repressive government.

A few months later, across the river in St. Louis, another crowd was also doing its share of singing and chanting. But these people were there entirely to have fun. Some people in the crowd were engaging in the new fad of "blanket-tossing," while others headed for the "mosh pit" to dance, shove, and eventually land in piles on the ground. Still others got their ears or noses pierced, or watched "Mr. Lifto" heft weights with chains attached to his nipples and other, more private parts. A few just listened to the music.

The first crowd described above had attended a rally to support 80-year-old dance legend Katherine Dunham, who had been fasting for weeks on end to oppose the deportations of the Haitians. The second was attending Lollapalooza, a seven-band touring "alternative" rock festival that became the hottest concert ticket of 1992. While both of the scenes above occurred in greater St. Louis, similar incidents took place in dozens of cities in early and mid-1992.

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Obviously, there are both similarities and differences between Lollapalooza and the Haitian refugee protest. These events illustrate two related but distinguishable phenomena known as collective behavior and social movements. Both of these events are examples of *collective behavior*, but with respect to purpose, organization, and duration, they are quite different. The Lollapalooza crowd had no purpose other than to have fun, and perhaps to shock a few adults. Those who participated in the refugee protest, in contrast, had a clear purpose to oppose U.S. deportations of Haitian refugees, and their activities were part of an ongoing effort organized on a nationwide level. Lollapalooza and the rally, both crowd situations, were examples of collective behavior, and were subject to similar dynamics. However, only the crowd at the Haitian refugee protest event was also part of a *social movement*. Purpose, organization, and continuity are among the characteristics that distinguish social movements from the broader concept of collective behavior.

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Collective behavior can be defined as large numbers of people acting together in an extraordinary situation, in which usual norms governing behavior do not apply. In some instances, people make up new norms as they go along. Collective behavior occurs in a great variety of forms, including crowds, rumors, panics, riots, “urban legends,” fashions and fads, mass hysteria, and mass suicide. As different as these things are, they all involve behaviors or shared beliefs by sizable numbers of people that deviate from normal patterns or from past norms (Lofland, 1986, p. 37).

Causes of Collective Behavior

One way in which collective behavior differs from other social behavior is that it does not normally occur in ongoing *social groups*; that is, groups that interact regularly and share a common purpose (see Chapter 7). Rather, collective behavior occurs among *aggregates* or *collectivities*: sets of people, often large in number, who interact only in a temporary or superficial way. These sets of people may be *localized* in one place, in which case they are called **crowds**, or they may be *dispersed*, as in the case of rumors, urban legends, and fashions (Turner and Killian, 1987). Dispersed collectivities are called **masses**.

There are two important characteristics of aggregates or collectivities that lead to behavior that does not occur in

ordinary, ongoing social groups. First, as the distinction implies, collectivities themselves interact only temporarily, even though they often include many small clusters of friends and acquaintances. In many cases the interaction in collectivities is superficial and at a distance. Second, unlike groups, collectivities do not have clear *boundaries*: In other words, it is not clear who belongs to a collectivity and who doesn't. Consider an outdoor rally at the center of a college campus. Some people are clearly participating; others are “just watching”; still others are “passing through” on their way to somewhere else. Are all of these people part of the crowd? Or does the crowd consist only of those who are participating or who stopped to watch? Or, perhaps, only those who actively participate? There is no obvious answer.

Because of these differences, some of the usual norms that govern human behavior can break down in collectivities, and people in collectivities therefore frequently behave in different ways than they otherwise would. Neil Smelser (1962) developed what he called a *value-added theory* to identify conditions that increase the likelihood of such collective behavior. Among the key elements of his theory are social control, structural conduciveness and structural strain, and precipitating incidents.

Breakdown of Social Control Clearly, *social control* (Chapter 8) is often weaker in collectivities than in groups, because the individual has no ongoing relationship with the collectivity to be concerned about. When you are in a crowd, you do not know most of the people around you, you will not likely see them again, and hence you do not have to worry about what they will think about you tomorrow. At the same time, the collectivity frequently develops norms of its own, often on the spot. Because the collectivity is temporary and ill-defined, it is not fully governed by the usual social norms. Therefore, it often develops norms that do not conform with the usual norms of society, and this gives members of the collectivity an alternative set of guidelines for behavior or beliefs. For example, in a crowd it may be acceptable, or even expected, to sing loudly, wave your hands in the air, engage in bawdy or controversial chants, or rush madly toward some common goal or away from some perceived threat. Any of these behaviors might violate ordinary, everyday norms, but conform to the norms of a crowd. Thus, when interacting with a collectivity, people sometimes do things they would never do either when alone or when part of their everyday, ongoing social groups.

Structural Conduciveness Although there must be a crowd or a mass in order for collective behavior to occur, crowds and masses do not always result in collective behavior.

Rather, collective behavior occurs when there is **structural conduciveness**—that is, when the situation in some way encourages collective behavior. Just what this means depends on the type of behavior. In the case of a rumor, fear, suspicion, and incomplete information are often underlying causes: People spread rumors concerning things they are afraid of or suspect, but about which they lack direct information (Rosnow and Fine, 1976). In the case of a riot, some collective grievance is often (though not always) present (Smelser, 1962). Smelser referred to the conflicts of interest that produce such grievances as *structural strain*. While structural strain is an example of the type of situation Smelser called structural conduciveness, it is people's response to that situation that leads to grievances. In other words, a *generalized belief* must exist among a sizable segment of the population, arising from the situation, in order for collective behavior to occur. That belief could be a grievance, or the belief that something unusual, such as a natural disaster, is under way or about to happen. As we discuss various types of collective behavior, we shall explore further the kinds of situations that are conducive to different types of collective behavior.

Precipitating Incident Finally, there is usually a **precipitating incident** that triggers some type of collective behavior (Smelser, 1963). In the case of fashion, it could be a particular style of clothes or hair worn by a famous person. Figure skater Dorothy Hamill, Princess Diana of Great Britain, and former U.S. First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis

Elvis Presley in concert. In the late 1980s, repeated rumors surfaced that Presley, who died in 1977, was in reality still alive.



each triggered a major fashion trend in hair style when she was at the peak of her popularity. In the case of riots, a fight or an arrest often acts as a precipitating incident; the 1992 Los Angeles riots, which were precipitated by the acquittal of police officers in the videotaped beating of Rodney King, illustrate this process. In the case of rumors, it may be the broadcast of the rumor by a television or radio station that makes it widespread, even when it has been around but generally ignored for years. Examples of this are the broadcast by a radio station in 1969 of a rumor that Beatle Paul McCartney was dead, and the broadcasts by several stations in 1988 that Elvis Presley, dead since 1977, was really alive. Though both rumors had been around for a long time, the broadcasts served as precipitating incidents, making them more widely circulated and believed.

Example: Soviet Upheaval We find a dramatic illustration of Smelser's theory in the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991. The precipitating incident came when government hard-liners attempted a coup against President Mikhail S. Gorbachev in August of that year, and in response, Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank and called for a general strike. But there was great structural conduciveness in the conditions of the Soviet Union: Communist Party officials suppressed dissent and lived in luxury, while the rest of the country's economy suffered. This led to general grievances that, when unleashed, resulted in actions all over the country to throw out and in some cases arrest former Party officials. Even before the coup, there had been a breakdown of social control. The old mechanisms of control had been largely dismantled by Gorbachev's reforms. But when massive crowds turned out in August 1991 to protect Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament Building, and whole units of the military and even the KGB secret police disobeyed the orders of the coup leaders, this breakdown accelerated rapidly. The result was that the coup collapsed. The Soviet people were empowered and became involved as never before, and the Communists were quickly swept out. Soon, the Soviet Union disintegrated as the former republics became independent countries, following declarations of independence by one republic after another.

Types of Collective Behavior

As has already been noted, one way to classify the various types of collective behavior is by the type of collectivity involved: crowd or mass. Another is by the predominant type of emotion expressed. According to Lofland (1985), three emotions are commonly expressed by collective behavior: fear, hostility, and joy. Other emotions, such as grief, may also drive collective behavior (Plutchik, 1962). Table 19.1 classifies various types of collective behavior according to the type of collectivity involved and the domi-

TABLE 19.1 Types of Collective Behavior

Type of Collectivity	Dominant Emotion			
	Fear	Hostility	Joy	Mixed or Other
Localized (crowd behavior)	Panics	Mobs Riots Protest crowds	Expressive crowds	Mass suicides Public grief
Dispersed (mass behavior)	Mass hysteria	Vilification	Fads Fashions	Rumors Urban legends

SOURCE: Adapted from John Lofland, 1985, *Protest: Studies of Collective Behavior and Social Movements*. Reprinted with permission from *Transaction*, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. The “fear,” “joy,” and “hostility” categories were formulated by Lofland; the “mixed or other” category was added by the author of this book.

nant emotion expressed. Our discussion of collective behavior is organized around this classification system. It should be stressed that the types of collective behavior described in Table 19.1 are not always distinct. Rather, they are ideal types that are only approximated in social reality. It is quite common, for example, for a crowd to represent something of a mixture of two or more of the types of crowd behavior shown in the table.

Collective Behavior in Crowds

As stated earlier, the mere presence of a crowd does not always produce collective behavior. Two types of crowds that do not usually produce collective behavior are casual crowds and conventional crowds (Blumer, 1969). *Casual crowds* are large numbers of people who are present in some place, such as a downtown sidewalk. Their attention becomes temporarily drawn together by some event such as an accident, but the action of the crowd does not go beyond viewing—nor is the presence of the crowd essential to the activity being viewed (Wright, 1978, p. 71). When the event is over (for example, an ambulance takes the injured person away), the people quickly return to their previous activities. *Conventional crowds* do share a common focus, but at a scheduled event such as a lecture, concert, or religious service. These events occur with some regularity and have a well-understood set of norms, so the crowd neither is normless nor makes up norms on the spot, as happens in the case of collective behavior. This type of crowd is essential to the event being viewed. Wright (1978, p. 40) cites the Tournament of Roses Parade—without the audience, the parade would have no purpose.

Conditions Conducive to Collective Behavior by Crowds Under conditions of *structural conduciveness*, however, crowds do engage in collective behavior. Even casual and conventional crowds can be changed into the types of crowds that engage in collective behavior. Structurally conducive conditions produce the emotions described in Table 19.1. A real or imagined danger, for exam-

ple, produces fear. A threat can produce hostility, as happened in East St. Louis, Illinois, in 1917, when whites came to believe that their jobs were being given away to blacks who were willing to work for less pay and without unions (Rudwick, 1964). As a result, whites stormed into black neighborhoods, killing, beating, raping, and burning. Forty-eight people died in the violence. Conditions that produce joy can also turn a crowd to collective behavior, as in the case of the violent celebrations that have occurred in several cities after their baseball teams won the World Series, and in Chicago in 1992 after the Bulls won the NBA championship. Any time a crowd is present in a situation that produces strong emotions such as fear, hostility, or joy (or a combination), collective behavior is possible.

Crowd Dynamics When the situation is conducive in this way, there are at least three distinct dynamics that can lead to the spread of collective behavior. One, which has been known to sociologists for nearly a century, is **contagion** (Le Bon, 1960 [orig. 1895]). An individual or small group of people in a crowd urges a course of action, or begins to move, chant, sing, or behave in some other visible way, and the behavior rapidly spreads through the crowd (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 21). Probably the basic dynamics of contagion involve nonverbal communication and imitation (Wright, 1978, p. 135). Once the behavior has been modeled, restraints against it may be reduced, leading others to behave the same way (Wheeler, 1966). The crowd behavior may *begin* spontaneously as a product of the dominant emotion in the crowd. More often, it will be triggered by organized behavior by a few people in the crowd, by a speaker urging some action upon the crowd, or by an external stimulus such as an activity going on at the edge of the crowd. Given that the emotion is shared and that the norms of the crowd are supportive, others in the crowd quickly imitate the behavior. Thus, people in the crowd forget their usual behavioral tendencies and are taken over by the emergent behavior of the crowd. It is this aspect of crowd behavior that renders it capable of sudden changes and often leads to the appearance that crowd behavior is unpredictable.

Although it can change quickly, however, crowd behavior is not necessarily *irrational*. Crowds do not do everything that is urged upon them, they do not imitate everything that some people in the crowd do, and they do not respond to every incident that occurs in their midst or near them (Rose, 1982, pp. 7–8). Rather, they are selective. Moreover, not everyone in the crowd adopts the most visible crowd behaviors (McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983, p. 581). In virtually every crowd action, some people are merely spectators. Even participants do not always behave in the same way. In crowd situations where violence occurs, for example, usually only a minority of those present participate in the violence. Others cheer them on, and still others just watch (Lewis, 1972; Turner and Killian, 1987). These facts have led some sociologists to reject the contagion explanation of crowd behavior. Even sociologists who still emphasize imitation and contagion no longer see the crowd as a mindless collectivity but believe, rather, that behaviors are suggested to the crowd through verbal and nonverbal communication (Wright, 1978). Sometimes the crowd follows these suggestions, sometimes it does not; even when it does, not everyone in the crowd participates.

The second important crowd dynamic is **convergence** (Berk, 1974; Turner and Killian, 1987). This concept refers to the sharing and consequent amplification of emotions, goals, or beliefs by many people in a crowd. As Gordon Allport (1924) put it, “The individual in the crowd behaves just as he would alone, *only more so*.” In other words, people in the crowd are influenced by common emotions or desires, as we have already seen. When they get in the crowd situation, they *act* upon these common emotions in a way they might not otherwise, because usual norms do not apply, and because speakers or actions of people in the crowd may intensify these emotions. Importantly, though, the behavior of the crowd is not irrational and would not be unpredictable to someone who understood the emotions of the people in the crowd.

One problem with this viewpoint is that the attitudes of those who participate in crowd behavior are not always distinguishable from those of nonparticipants. McPhail (1971), for example, was able to find little attitudinal difference between participants and nonparticipants in urban riots. One answer to this issue may be found in Rose’s (1982, p. 97) notion of “protesters as representative.” He argues that certain groups among whom protest occurs (he cites inner-city blacks and college students in the 1960s as examples) *do* share attitudes conducive to collective behavior, and these attitudes *are* different from those of others in their society. When these groups come together in crowds, the convergence process can lead to collective behavior. On the other hand, within such groups, the attitudes of participants and nonparticipants in collective behavior may not be very different. From this viewpoint, convergence may explain why collective behavior occurred among

blacks and college students much more than among other groups in the 1960s, and why these groups again seem to be more involved than others in collective behavior and protest in the 1990s. It may not be of much use, however, in explaining why some blacks and college students participate in collective behavior and others do not.

The third important crowd dynamic is **emergent norms**, the process whereby the crowd collectively and interactively develops its own definition of the situation and norms about how to behave. If the crowd comes to some agreement on such definitions and norms, they then come to dominate the behavior of people in the crowd. If it does not, collective behavior will not occur. Turner and Killian (1987, p. 27) argue that the more unfamiliar and uncertain the situation, the more easily members of a crowd mutually influence one another, which increases the likelihood that the crowd will come to such agreement.

Crowd Dynamics: Two Examples Contagion, convergence, and emergent norms are each dynamics that have been offered as explanations of why people in crowds often behave differently than they usually would. When they were originally developed, these crowd behavior theories were seen as mutually exclusive (Wright, 1978, p. 133). In reality, however, all three theories can tell us something about the processes that influence crowd behavior. This can be illustrated by crowd dynamics in two protests observed by the author. One of these was a 1992 student protest at the campus where I teach. Although the main target was a large tuition increase, the protest addressed a broad range of grievances, including cutbacks, campus environmental concerns, financial aid problems, layoffs of university workers, and what students saw as misplaced priorities (such as building new sports facilities while the library was cancelling subscriptions and classes were being closed). The common theme linking all of the grievances was the view that the administration did not really care very much about what students thought.

The protest began with an outdoor rally that lasted about an hour. A series of speakers addressed various issues, and the crowd for the most part stood around and listened. Several speakers attacked the university administration for being unresponsive to student concerns. After about an hour, one of the leaders of the protest turned toward the administration building and shouted, “Mr. President, are you listening to your students?” Turning back to the crowd, she added, “I don’t think so. Maybe we should go up there, peacefully and nonviolently, and let him know what we think. In fact, I think I will. Anyone want to go with me?”

At that point, the student started walking toward the building, followed by several other protest leaders carrying an effigy of the president. Nearly everyone in the crowd immediately followed, and the result was a sit-in in the president’s office that caught campus security authorities

completely by surprise. The sit-in lasted for most of the rest of the day, ending only when a vice president met with the students for two hours and the president agreed to meet the protest leaders later.

This example illustrates some important points about crowd dynamics. The speaker's rhetoric and example had been followed quickly by the rapid spread through the crowd of the idea of marching to the president's office and sitting in. This happened even though no march had been advertised, and even though most people had no intention of taking such an action when they arrived at the rally. Thus, there was a process of *contagion*. The crowd did not blindly follow the speaker's exhortation in some irrational manner, however, nor was it inevitable that a march and sit-in would occur just because a speaker urged it. Rather, the speaker was able to successfully tap a common emotion in the crowd—a frustration with what nearly everyone in the crowd perceived as unresponsiveness on the part of the university's administration. It was her ability to perceive and call upon this common emotion that made the contagion possible. This illustrates an important point: Contagion did not *cause* the march and sit-in to occur; more generally, it does not cause collective behavior to occur. Instead, contagion is a process by which the idea of taking an action—in this case, marching and sitting in—spreads through a crowd. The underlying condition that made the rapid spread of the idea possible was *convergence*: Nearly everyone in the crowd was unhappy with the university's administration and wanted to “do something about it.” These attitudes had existed all along; they did not suddenly appear when the speaker urged a march on the president's office. When she successfully tapped into these attitudes, however, the norm that the crowd should march emerged and the crowd quickly took that action.


Another demonstration I observed more than two decades earlier at the campus where I attended graduate school illustrates that it is *not* inevitable that a crowd will take an action urged upon it. This example also shows how opposing norms can divide a crowd, at least temporarily. This protest, against the Vietnam War, had drawn a particularly angry crowd, frustrated by a sudden escalation of the war—the bombing of Hanoi—at a time when there was increasing talk of peace and of winding down the war. The crowd had marched around the campus and arrived at the ROTC building, long viewed by anti-war students as an unwanted symbol of military presence on campus. Despite the anger of the crowd, its behavior changed abruptly when a small group behaved in a way that violated the norms of most people in the crowd. This group broke into the building and began throwing chairs and typewriters through the windows. At that point the bulk of the crowd suddenly fell silent, a few began to shout “Stop!” and others walked away. Within minutes, almost the entire crowd of about 2,000 had turned its back on those vandalizing the building

and walked over and sat in a nearby street. Dramatically, the crowd had rejected the behavior of the vandals and said “Civil disobedience yes, violence no.” In this case, there was no contagion leading to imitation, and neither convergence nor an emergent norm in support of the violent behavior of would-be leaders. Rather, the emergent norm was to reject that behavior, and substitute the more acceptable behavior of peacefully blocking traffic. Thus, it is clear that although crowds often follow, they do not necessarily do so blindly.

Types of Crowd Behavior

Although collective behavior in crowds usually spreads as a result of one or more of the three dynamics discussed above, the emotions that lead to that behavior vary widely among different types of crowds. Again referring to Table 19.1, the two examples presented above can best be classified as cases where the dominant emotion expressed by the crowd is hostility. This emotion typically produces either *protest crowds* like the ones in the examples (McPhail and Wohlman, 1983), or the more violent *acting crowds*, such as mobs and riots (Blumer, 1969). If the dominant emotion is fear, the likely result is a *panic*. Joy leads to *expressive crowds*, illustrated by the example of a World Series celebration (Blumer, 1969). Various other emotions or mixtures of emotions can produce other types of crowd behavior, of which *public grief* and *mass suicide* are examples. As noted earlier, these crowd types are ideal types; real crowds may only roughly approximate them, or may show characteristics reflecting two or more of these types.

Protest Crowds We have already seen several examples of *protest crowds*: crowds whose purpose is to achieve political goals (McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983) and whose dominant emotion is often hostility or anger (Lofland, 1985). The Haitian refugee protest and the two student demonstrations previously discussed were all protest crowds. Other recent examples of protest crowds include the massive mobilization of students and workers in Beijing, China, in 1989; the throngs of anti-abortion protesters who descended on Wichita, Kansas, during the summer of 1991; and the hundreds of thousands of Soviets who rallied in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere in 1991 to oppose the attempted coup and to protect the elected leaders of the republics. The activities of protest crowds include rallies, marches, picket lines, and sometimes **civil disobedience**—actions such as sit-ins, blocking traffic, and mass trespassing that violate the law but are nonviolent. Although the vast majority of protest crowds remain nonviolent (Eisinger, 1973; Gamson, 1975), they do occasionally turn violent, at which point the protest crowd has been converted into an *acting crowd*.



This is an example of a protest crowd, in this case college students whose purpose is to achieve a political goal, to block tuition increases.

Expressive Crowds *Expressive crowds* are crowds whose predominant action is to express some emotion, usually joy, excitement, or ecstasy. Examples of expressive crowds are audiences at sports events and at rock concerts and festivals, and people attending religious revivals. In each of these examples, people collectively express their emotions in ways that they would not in other situations. Such behaviors include cheering, booing, and throwing streamers at sports events; moving with the music, clapping, and holding up lighted matches at rock concerts; and shouting, singing, arm waving, and “speaking in tongues” at religious revivals. The Lollapalooza crowd described at the beginning of the chapter is a good example of an expressive crowd.

Although expressive crowds are most often moved by joy or exuberance, they can also express other emotions, such as grief. The thousands of people who lined the streets for the funerals of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King were expressing a common emotion. *Public grief*, however, can be either a crowd behavior or a mass behavior. Although the crowds at these funerals were feeling and expressing grief, so were millions of others nationwide and worldwide who were watching the funerals on television at home.

According to Turner and Killian (1987), both collective and individualistic forces are at work in expressive crowds. At the collective level, there is the widely shared emotion that produces the behavior, often triggered by an event such as a winning goal in a soccer or hockey game, or by the death of a well-loved public figure. Also, the behavior of the crowd exerts pressures on others to conform. When everyone around you is clapping, chanting, or moving in a particular direction, you may feel very out of place if you stand there and do nothing. At the individual level, there is

personality need. Many people find everyday life repetitive and boring, so they enjoy the change of pace and excitement of cheering, singing, shouting, or dancing in an expressive crowd. The crowd makes such behavior acceptable when it would otherwise be regarded as strange or immoral (Turner and Killian, 1987). Some people also find that participating in the emotional behavior of an expressive crowd gives them a sense of being “part of things,” of gaining the approval of the crowd. Thus, joining with the crowd is helpful to their self-esteem.


Acting Crowds: Mobs, Riots, and Panics Protest crowds, expressive crowds, and even casual or conventional crowds can, under the right circumstances, be transformed into *acting crowds*. Acting crowds are crowds that engage in violent or destructive behavior. There are three main types of acting crowds, all of which overlap somewhat: mobs, riots, and panics.

MOBS A **mob** is an extremely emotional acting crowd that directs its violence against a specific target. This target can be a person, a group of people, or a physical object. Mob violence is often of short duration, because once the mob has vented its anger against its target, it often views its work as finished and breaks up.

A type of mob behavior that has been particularly common in the history of the United States (much more so than elsewhere) is the *lynch mob*, which captures and kills, often by hanging, a person suspected or accused of a crime or other social transgression. In the United States, lynching has frequently been a form of racial violence. It was particularly common in the South between the end of the Civil War and about 1930 (Franklin, 1969, p. 439). Some reports estimate that 2,500 lynchings occurred during the last 16 years of the nineteenth century. The majority of the victims were black males. Although many of them were accused of murder or rape (often without evidence), many others were killed for real or imagined violations of Jim Crow segregation practices (Raper, 1933). These “violations” included such things as being in an area reserved for whites, “talking smart” to whites (especially white women), or simply being too prosperous or well educated.

Lynchings were also fairly common in the West, particularly in the nineteenth century. There, more of the victims were white, although a disproportionate number were of Mexican or Asian ancestry (Mirande, 1987). The nature of these mob actions is captured in the following excerpt from Pitt (1966, p. 77) concerning one mob during the Gold Rush days in California:

Miners gathered at nearby Devil Springs and vowed to “exterminate the Mexican race from the country.” Thereupon, some Yankees seized one Mexican each at Yaqui’s Camp and at Cherokee Ranch for extrane-



The beating of Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots follows a pattern of people in one group attacking people in another.

ous reasons and strung them up immediately. Hundreds of miners thrust guns and knives into their belts, roamed angrily over the 5-mile region from San Andreas to Calaveras Forks, and methodically drove out the entire Mexican population — as prospectors had done in previous seasons — and confiscated all property.

Although lynchings may be distinctively American, mob violence is not. In 1988, for example, a number of Soviet soldiers were killed while trying to protect Soviet Armenians hiding in their homes from death at the hands of angry mobs of Soviet Azerbaijanis. Historically, mob action has been a precipitating event for revolution on a number of occasions, as when the storming of the Bastille (a French prison where political prisoners were held) marked the start of the French Revolution.

RIOTS The main difference between a mob and a riot is that a riot is less focused on a particular target. A **riot** can be defined as violent crowd behavior, aimed against people, property, or both, which is not directed at one specific target. As with mobs, the emotions that most often underlie riots are anger and hostility. Sometimes these emotions are the result of competition between two groups, each of which feels it is being treated unfairly. When this occurs, rioting often takes the form of mass street fighting between opposing groups, or of attacks by crowds of one group against people in another group. Earlier chapters described the frequent history of this type of violence in the United States; similar violence has occurred between Chinese and Malays in Malaysia, Sikhs and Hindus in India, and Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union.

On other occasions, underlying resentment and feelings of unfair treatment among one group lead that group to rise in violent rebellion. This is often triggered by a precipitating incident, such as an arrest (U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968). In this type of riot, most of the crowd violence is directed against property rather than people, except for violence between the crowd and police or troops. This pattern of violence, marked by rebellion rather than street fighting, was the typical form of violence in the so-called ghetto riots of the 1960s. Rebellion was also the dominant feature in the 1992 riots in Los Angeles and other cities following the acquittal of police in the videotaped beating of Rodney King. But there were a few incidents in Los Angeles, such as the beating of truck driver Reginald Denny and the attacks on Korean-owned businesses, that suggest a return to the old pattern of people in one group attacking people in another. In riots in which the dominant pattern is rebellion, studies have indicated that when deaths occur, they are usually the result of police action, not actions by rioters (Conot, 1967).

In some instances, riots occur when protest crowds get out of hand, as in the example of the march on the ROTC building described earlier. They can also occur when agents of the state seeking to control a protest crowd themselves get out of order. Two prime examples are the “police riot” outside the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago (U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1968) and the beatings of civil rights demonstrators in 1963 by Birmingham, Alabama, police. Like the Rodney King case, both of these events led to widespread shock and controversy because they were videotaped and televised.

In all of the preceding examples, hostility or anger was the dominant emotion of the crowd. In other cases, however, joy, exuberance, or the desire to have fun may either lead to or sustain a riot. Sometimes, expressive crowds like those celebrating a sports team victory or students on spring break turn into acting crowds that break windows, loot stores, or fight with police. In some cases, the situation is exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption by much of the crowd.

In other cases, however, either riots or protest crowds may be taken over by feelings of exuberance. In the Los Angeles riot in 1992, for example, many looters took advantage of the breakdown of social control to get “something for nothing,” and in some parts of the city, the looting took on a carnival atmosphere. Much the same occurred in Montreal during a 1969 police strike (Clark, 1987). The same can happen in cases of civil disobedience or even mere protest. In China in 1989, student protesters in Tiananmen Square reveled when crowds from the outskirts of the city temporarily blocked tanks sent to put down the protest. Rose (1982) describes this as the “Roman holiday” phase — people in the crowd rejoice at having “conquered the

street,” at least for the time, much as they might celebrate a victory at a sports event. Nearly always, though, this phase is temporary, followed by fierce suppression by forces of social control angered at their embarrassment. In all three examples above, forces of control soon appeared en masse to restore control, and in China, the results were tragic: Thousands of students and workers died when the army crushed the protest.

PANICS Another type of crowd action is the **panic**. Panics occur when crowds react suddenly to perceived entrapment or exclusion, resulting in spontaneous and often self-destructive behavior. Thus, panics differ from riots and mobs in that fear, rather than anger, is the dominant emotion. There are two common types of panic. In the most common, people seek to escape some perceived danger, such as a fire, an earthquake, or a military attack. They perceive themselves as entrapped and react accordingly. This reaction is especially likely when the danger is sudden and unexpected and the escape routes are limited. The other type of panic occurs when a crowd is seeking to gain access to an event or a location and perceives itself to be in danger of being excluded. In both types of panic, surging and pushing occur, and deaths often result from suffocation and trampling. Examples of the first type of panic are fires at the Iroquois Theater in Chicago (1902; 602 deaths), the Coconut Grove Nightclub in Boston (1942; 491 deaths), and the Beverly Hills Supper Club in Southgate, Kentucky

A panic occurs when a crowd feels trapped or excluded. Surging and pushing occur, and deaths often result from suffocation and trampling.



(1980; 164 deaths). Examples of the second type of panic are stampedes at the entrance to a concert by the rock band The Who in Cincinnati (1979; 11 deaths) and at a soccer match in Sheffield, England (1989; 94 deaths).

Turner and Killian (1987) list four main factors characteristic of panic situations. The first is *partial entrapment*—limited escape routes in escape panics, and limited entrance routes in panics directed toward entry. In the cases of the Who concert and the soccer match mentioned above, for example, the number of entrances was far too small to accommodate the crowd, and in the case of the soccer match, lines were further backed up by a crowd-control fence to keep fans off the field. Second is *perceived threat*—a generalized belief, usually sudden, that there is danger of exclusion or entrapment. This leads to an emergent norm that the crowd must act immediately. For example, in the case of both the Who concert and the soccer match, the crowd suddenly surged forward when people believed that the event they were waiting for had started. Next comes *breakdown of escape route*—the path the crowd is trying to take becomes jammed, so nobody can move through. Finally, there is *failure of front-to-rear communications*—people in back keep pressing forward because they do not know that people in front have blocked their escape routes. In fact, the reverse appears to be true: The rear of the crowd moves forward because people in front are being jammed more tightly together.

In addition, Mintz (1951) has noted that once panic behavior begins, it becomes a model and a threat: If you see others pushing in a theater fire situation, you may push back to protect your own position. The disturbance spreads as people press their personal advantage at the group's expense, ultimately to everyone's detriment. At this point, panic behavior has become the norm of the crowd—a situation Smelser (1963) calls the *derived phase* of the panic.

Mass Suicide One of the rarest but most frightening forms of crowd behavior is *mass suicide*. Mass suicide illustrates the extremes to which collective behavior can go under certain circumstances. One well-known modern case of mass suicide occurred in a jungle camp called Jonestown in the South American country of Guyana in 1978, where more than 900 Americans died in one day after knowingly drinking from a vat of Kool Aid poisoned with cyanide. Another apparently occurred in April 1993, when about 80 people died in a fiery inferno at the compound of the Branch Davidian cult near Waco, Texas. How could such things happen? Many analysts at the time focused on the bizarre personalities of the groups' leaders, the Reverend Jim Jones and David Koresh. Such analyses miss some important points about how the *situation* can lead to such events. Can you, for example, imagine *anyone*, no matter how unusual or persuasive, convincing everyone in your introductory sociology class to commit suicide?



Over 900 people died in the mass suicide in Jonestown, Guyana, in 1978.

Rather than looking merely at the personality of the leaders, we must examine the background of the Jonestown and Waco tragedies. Jones's group, the People's Temple, had been active in the San Francisco area for more than 20 years. Most of its adherents were poor, not well educated, black, and disillusioned with the American system. Jones's blend of fundamentalist Christian ritual, liberal Christian "social gospel," and Marxism therefore appealed to his audience. Several other elements, however, added to the structural conduciveness of the situation. First, Jones had persuaded a large portion of his congregation to leave San Francisco to establish a utopian religious community in the jungle of Guyana. This move had two important effects: It narrowed the group to those who were willing to commit themselves totally to Jones's movement, and it isolated the members from any outside influences (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 360). In effect, it converted what had been a religious organization into a *total institution*, as described in Chapter 5. Groups of friends and kin within Jonestown were systematically broken up, and people were required to demonstrate their commitment to Jones by giving him their personal property and having sex with him (Coser and Coser, 1979, pp. 160–162; see also Hall, 1979). Clearly, this background set the stage for people's compliant behavior when ordered by Jones to commit suicide.

Like other forms of collective behavior, though, a *precipitating incident* acted as a trigger to the mass suicide. In this case, it was the murder of a U.S. congressman from California, Leo Ryan, and four other people who had come to investigate conditions at the camp. This incident gave reality to the long-standing belief by members of the group that the governments of the United States and Guyana were "out to get" the organization. In the eyes of People's Temple members, the killing of Ryan had now given these governments the excuse they needed, and apparently few of them doubted that doom was at hand. Jones assembled the

group and urged them to "die with dignity" by drinking the poison—a behavior that they had rehearsed many times. They did so (including Jones), giving it first to their children and then taking it themselves. Apparently, only a few resisted and were forced to drink the poison; most willingly poisoned themselves and their own children.

Similar circumstances existed in the Branch Davidian case. Like Jones, David Koresh isolated his followers. The group resided in a compound called "Mt. Carmel" in an isolated rural area outside Waco, Texas. Access of outsiders to the compound was tightly restricted. A number of his followers came from outside the United States, so these members were separated from their homeland much like Jones's followers in Guyana. Koresh's followers, too, were often "down on their luck" and disillusioned and frustrated by society; many of them found acceptance in the Branch Davidian cult that they could not find in the larger society. Among the cult's beliefs was the doctrine that the world was soon to come to an end in a wave of fiery destruction. Thus, there was a substantial element of a self-fulfilling prophecy in the group's ultimate demise.

As with Jonestown, there was a precipitating incident. After a shootout between cult members and federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agents earlier in 1993, a standoff ensued that lasted for more than two months. Then one morning, FBI agents tried to force the group to surrender by knocking holes in the walls of the compound and spraying in tear gas. But after a few hours, the compound burst into flames—apparently in several separate places, indicating that the fires were set by people inside. A few people ran out and escaped, but the great majority, including children who may have been given no chance to escape, remained inside and died. Some of the people who died were shot.

The elements of total commitment to a movement or a leader, isolation from and conflict with the outside world, and a perception of impending doom appear to be common to other instances of mass suicide. Turner and Killian (1987, pp. 356–357) offer two similar examples: the suicide of up to 50,000 members of a Chinese movement in 1864, and the mass suicide (and killing of their children) by an Israeli religious group known as the Zealots in 66 B.C. In both instances, the groups in question had waged military warfare with the larger society and had become hopelessly surrounded by their enemies. Rather than grant their enemies a victory, they killed themselves.

Copycat Suicides A phenomenon somewhat related to mass suicide is that of "copycat suicides," which occur when people commit suicide following the widely reported death or suicide of a famous or admired individual (Gundlach and Stack, 1988). Research by Wasserman (1984), for example, has shown that suicides increase during the month after the suicide of a famous celebrity. Fictional

suicides, as on soap operas and television movies, however, do *not* seem to cause an increase in the incidence of suicide (Kessler and Stipp, 1984; Phillips, 1987). “Copycat suicides” are a form of collective behavior, but they are best classified as mass behavior rather than crowd behavior because they occur among people who are separated from one another, yet subject to the same collective influences. We now turn to an analysis of some more common forms of mass behavior.

Mass Behavior

As noted above, *mass behavior* is collective behavior that takes place among *dispersed collectivities*—people who are separated from one another yet share some common source of information or communication and respond with similar forms of collective behavior. The most important types of mass behavior are *rumors*, *urban legends*, *mass hysteria*, *fashions*, and *fads*. It is important to stress that although these behaviors are treated as mass behaviors, some of them can also occur in crowds. Rumors and the 1974 streaking fad are two examples. Rumors can and do sweep through crowds, although they can also travel in the absence of crowds. Streaking was usually a crowd behavior, but it spread quickly from place to place by means of communication that did not involve crowds. In fact, the peak of the behavior occurred the day after all three television networks reported it on the evening news (Aguirre, Quarantelli, and Mendoza, 1988).

Types of Mass Behavior

Rumors Rumors are unconfirmed items of information that spread by word of mouth and, in some cases, unconfirmed media reports. Rumors can be partially based on fact; however, in all cases, they tend to change as they are spread.

Rumors often begin in a context where something unusual is happening. One example is a situation in which some other form of collective behavior has taken place or is expected to take place. Thus, for example, whites fearful of black violence in cities during the 1960s often believed rumors such as the one that blacks had decided to meet at some specified time and march into the downtown area to attack whites and burn stores. Blacks similarly believed rumors that white gangs or police had beaten, raped, or castrated innocent blacks. A few years later, alienated and angry students on various campuses circulated rumors following the Kent State killings that National Guard troops had been massed at some site near their own campuses and were ready to take over the campus at a moment’s notice.

Almost none of these rumors were true. In all of these cases, however, all the conditions conducive to rumors

were present. Rumors, like other collective behavior, occur when the situation is structurally conducive. Generally, this means that complete, unambiguous, and confirmed information is unavailable; people are distrustful of sources of information; and people either *want* to believe something is true or *fear* that something is true. In these cases, real information concerning the rumors was hard to come by. Whites and blacks, in their separate neighborhoods, knew very little about each other’s actions, and students were equally unaware of the true actions of the National Guard. In both cases, people believed that the information contained in the rumors was being kept secret by authorities to avoid inflaming an already tense situation. Finally, the rumors confirmed people’s worst fears: the fear by whites that they or their businesses would be attacked by angry blacks; the fear by blacks of being brutalized by whites, particularly the police; and the fear by students that their campus would be overrun by armed troops who had already killed students elsewhere. In the absence of such fears, these rumors would have been far less believable. Because of such rumors, rumor-control centers were established in many cities and on many college campuses during the turmoil of the 1960s. Not surprisingly, they received thousands of calls.

Nonlocalized Rumors The rumors described above were localized in nature—that is, they tended to concern one campus or one city—though there was an element of mass behavior in that very similar rumors swept dozens of campuses and cities. In some instances, however, a single rumor will rapidly sweep an entire country. These rumors often involve famous personalities. Examples have already been mentioned: the rumor in 1969 that Beatle Paul McCartney was dead, and the rumor in 1988 that Elvis Presley, dead for 11 years, was in fact still alive. In each case, people who believed the rumors could find all kinds of “evidence.” “Clues” such as a barefoot Paul McCartney on the cover of the *Abbey Road* album (people are often buried without shoes) and the words “Turn me on, dead man” when the Beatles song “Revolution Number Nine” is played backward, were discovered by radio disc jockeys and broadcast to the public. Among the disillusioned and skeptical youth of 1969, these clues were readily interpreted as hidden messages from the surviving Beatles. Similarly, radio stations broadcast reports of “sightings” of Elvis, giving hope to the many people who wanted to believe that he still lived.

Rumors have also circulated nationwide concerning certain products and companies. One such rumor that circulated for years was that the corporate logo of Procter and Gamble was a symbol of devil worship. Actually, the logo, which had been used in various versions since 1882, represented something very different. The man in the moon was a popular design in the early days of the company in the late



This logo, used in various versions by Procter and Gamble since 1882, became the object of one of America's most persistent rumors in the early 1980s. The logo was removed from most products in 1985, and entirely dropped in 1991.

nineteenth century, and the 13 stars represented the original American states. Despite great efforts over the years by Procter and Gamble to dispel the rumors, they persisted, and in 1991, Procter and Gamble replaced the logo it had used for over a century.

Urban Legends Consider the following story. Perhaps you've heard it, or something like it:

A Bergen citizen who several days a week drives a ready-mix cement truck as a second job the other day came by his own residence and saw a friend's car with a sun roof parked there. He stopped the cement truck and went in the apartment building to say hello. But sounds from the bedroom gave him to understand it wasn't him but rather his wife that the fellow had come to visit. Without disturbing the couple in the bedroom, the man went back out of the building and over to his friend's car. He pulled the sun roof back, and backed the cement truck alongside it. Then he switched on the delivery system and filled the parked car with about two cubic meters of cement. When the lover came back for his car, the cement was completely hard.

Though this story appeared in a Norwegian newspaper in 1973, local versions of it circulated throughout all the Scandinavian countries, as well as Germany, England, and Kenya. Its origin, however, was in the United States, not Norway, and it dates back at least to 1960. By 1961, 43 distinct versions had circulated in various parts of the United States, most of which claimed that the event had taken place in the local area where the story was being circulated (Brunvand, 1981, pp. 126-132). This story is an example of an **urban legend**: an unsubstantiated story containing a plot that is widely circulated *and believed*. Urban legends are very similar to rumors, except that they are more complex. Like rumors, they are based on fears and concerns that people have — such as what your partner is up to when you aren't around. Like rumors, they change as they are circulated. The Norwegian version of the concrete car story involved a Volkswagen, whereas the American version usually involved a Cadillac. Like rumors, they may be partially based in fact. This story, for example, may have been partially based on a 1960 publicity stunt by a Denver concrete company, in which a car (a 14-year-old De Soto) was filled with concrete and publicly displayed (Brunvand, 1981). The story was already in circulation before that incident, however, and most versions of the legend bore little resemblance to the real incident.

In some cases, the themes of urban legends are very similar to the themes of rumors. Unexpected problems with fast food or mass-produced food are a common theme, as are stories about mice in soft-drink bottles or about people eating fast-food fried chicken in the dark, deciding that it "tastes funny," and turning on the light to discover they are really eating a batter-fried rat that somehow "went through the process." Such stories carry a moral: If you shirk your responsibilities by opting for fast food, you will be at risk. A particular aspect that highlights this is the fact that it is usually a *woman* who supposedly eats the rat, suggesting that if she had attended to the traditional female role and cooked dinner, she would have avoided her awful fate (Fine, 1979).

The key point about urban legends (which are not limited to cities) is that they are not only told but believed. I have heard convincing versions of all the stories mentioned above, in some cases recounted by fellow sociologists who believed every word of them. Typically, they happened to a "friend of a friend," and some of them (like the cement car) even get reported in newspapers. They can never be fully verified, however, or if they are verified, it turns out that what actually happened is quite different from what is reported in the story (Brunvand, 1981, 1984, 1986). They are believed because they call up fears or concerns that are real; because they describe embarrassing situations that we could imagine happening to ourselves; or because they relate to some aspect of modern life that we accept yet find at least mildly disturbing. Often, like true fictional stories,

they contain a moral: Don't become involved with your friend's wife; don't eat too much fast food.

Mass Hysteria **Mass hysteria** occurs when many people in a sizable geographic area perceive and respond frantically to some danger. Often the danger is not real or, if real, is not as great as people believe. As was discussed in Chapter 16, contagious diseases often lead to such hysteria. The plagues of medieval Europe, the worldwide influenza epidemic of the early twentieth century, and the current AIDS epidemic have all provoked mass hysteria. Although the danger of disease is real, the hysteria leads people to behave in ways that either heighten the danger or create other problems while it does nothing to curtail the spread of the disease. This happened in the case of the plagues: People spread the disease by fleeing from the cities where it broke out, and doctors refused to treat sick people for fear of contracting the disease themselves. Scapegoats were common: Such diverse groups as Jews, deformed people, and nobles were persecuted for creating this suffering (Thomlinson, 1976, p. 90). Today, as described in Chapter 16, the AIDS scare has in some instances led to increased prejudice against homosexuals, and AIDS victims have been abandoned by their families and friends and banned from school and work—despite the fact that the disease cannot be caught through casual contact.

Mass hysteria resembles panics, except that it does not take place in crowds, but rather among dispersed masses who often become agitated as a result of rumors or media broadcasts. The best-known example occurred on the night before Halloween in 1938, when Orson Welles broadcast a radio play, *The War of the Worlds*. Made to sound like a news report about an invasion by Martians, Welles's program was believed by many people who—despite a disclaimer at the midway point that it was only a play—flooded police switchboards with frightened calls. Others gathered in groups to discuss the frightening invasion, and still others jumped in their cars to flee, which created massive traffic jams in some areas. Just how many people really believed the report is a disputed point: It may have been only a tiny percentage (Rosengren et al., 1975), or it may have been as many as a quarter of those who heard it (Cantril, 1940). However many it was, public manifestations of the hysteria were quite visible in some areas and attracted a good deal of media attention (Rosengren et al., 1975).

Part of the reason that this radio play about an invasion by hostile Martians led to mass hysteria was that the world was on the brink of World War II. People felt insecure and afraid; events seemed to be out of control. Concerns about war brought a very different type of mass behavior in another incident, the "Great Los Angeles Air Raid," in which people incorrectly believed that Japanese planes were attacking Los Angeles. When they learned it was a

false alarm, people were disappointed that they lost an opportunity for combat with the enemy, and the military was angered by newspaper reports that their anti-aircraft guns had been blazing away at nothing (Mazon, 1984; Smith, 1976). Fears of war may have also played a role in a recent, and highly studied, incident of mass hysteria: the 1990 Midwest earthquake scare, discussed in the box on p. 538.

Fashions and Fads

FASHIONS Two closely related types of collective behavior among masses are *fashions* and *fads*. A **fashion** is a style of appearance or behavior that is favored by a large number of people for a limited amount of time. The most common fashions concern dress and hair style (Lofland, 1985, p. 67), although there are also fashions in automobiles, home decoration, landscaping, and city neighborhoods. Even activities are sometimes governed by fashion; for example, surfing, tennis, Transcendental Meditation, and stamp collecting (Irwin, 1977). Language, too, is the subject of fashion. Lofland (1985, p. 67) illustrates this point with the changing terms used by young people to show approval: "Swell!" in the 1930s, "Neat!" in the 1950s, "Right on!" in the 1960s, and "Really!" in the 1970s. By definition, fashions change over time. In this regard, fashions are a product of modern industrialized society. In preindustrial societies, dress and behavior are governed by long-standing traditions that do not change as long as the same society persists (Lofland, 1973). Popular dress in Morocco today, for example, is the same as it was 200 years ago. Contrast this to the United States, where styles of dress today bear little resemblance to those at the time of the American Revolution.

Like other aspects of collective behavior, fashions reflect people's values. During the 1960s, when sexual freedom and new experiences were valued, the miniskirt was popular. In the 1970s, however, that style changed, reflecting two shifts in values: the rise of feminism and a more conservative sexual climate.

FADS **Fads** are amusing mass involvements or activities, usually somewhat unconventional, that are temporary in nature. They are similar to fashions, except that they are of shorter duration and are typically adopted by a smaller number of people. The short duration of fads is illustrated by streaking, which came and went in 1974 within a period of about two months, with a peak of intensity that lasted only one week (Aguirre, Quarantelli, and Mendoza, 1988). Fads typically are less serious and more frivolous than fashions, and are much less likely to be linked to core values or lifestyles. Besides being more frivolous, fads are often limited to one item or behavior. According to Lofland (1985, p. 69), there are four common types of fads:

THE EARTHQUAKE THAT WASN'T

Scientists agree that it is not possible to predict when and where an earthquake will occur. That didn't stop self-proclaimed climatologist Iben Browning from predicting a 50-50 chance of a major earthquake on Missouri's New Madrid Fault around December 3, 1990. It also didn't stop thousands of people in a half-dozen states from Arkansas to Indiana from believing his forecast. I was fortunate to participate in one of the dozen or so studies of this outbreak of collective behavior, and our studies and others revealed a number of fascinating findings. Surveys revealed that 10 to 25 percent of the population in the area for which the earthquake was predicted clearly believed the forecast, and another 20 to 35 percent gave it some credibility. This was despite scientific disclaimers that Browning's method had been disproven and that, contrary to widely circulated news reports, there was no evidence he had ever successfully predicted an earthquake. Belief in the forecast decreased with level of education, and younger people and women were somewhat more likely to believe it than older people and

men. Yet, in all groups, a significant minority believed Browning's forecast.

People also planned and (less often) took a variety of actions to protect themselves from the feared earthquake. Some actions were useful preparation for the earthquake that is indeed likely someday to occur on the New Madrid Fault—storing food and water, securing objects that could fall, learning to turn off utilities. Thus, the scare had the useful effect of increasing earthquake preparedness in the New Madrid seismic zone. But other responses are better described as hysteria, based on unfounded concern about a quake on a particular date. These responses included planning to keep children home from school, to stay home from work, to avoid crossing bridges, and even to leave town. Interestingly, such plans were not particularly related to whether or not people believed the forecast: Rather, they seemed to be a product of communication between significant others. Those whose friends and neighbors planned such actions were also likely to plan them themselves, *whether or not they believed in the forecast*. This illustrates what Turner, Nigg, and Paz (1986) called the *two-step flow of communications*: People get their information from the media, such as television reports about earthquake forecasts, and may use these sources to decide what to believe. But when it comes to deciding what to do, they look to their friends for guidance.

Follow-up surveys after the predicted December earthquake failed to materialize showed that the number who actually took such actions was smaller than the number who planned to—but some did so, nonetheless. Around 1 percent of those surveyed in eastern and southeast Missouri, for example, acknowledged leaving the area because of the forecast. About one out of six made some schedule changes. But the majority of these people did so because their children's schools closed as a result of the forecast. Nearly all schools in southeast Missouri, and some in neighboring areas, closed December 2 and 3.

Why did this event happen? For one, people in the Midwest have little experience with earthquakes, yet have been warned that they are in an earthquake-prone area. Their awareness of the risk was heightened by the dramatic videos of damage in San Francisco and Oakland from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. In such an atmosphere, Browning offered an easy answer, and many people turned to it. In addition, the media had been quite uncritical in reporting—incorrectly, it turns out—that Browning had predicted previous earthquakes, including the one in San Francisco–Oakland. Finally, public apprehension surrounding the impending Persian Gulf War may have played a role: One survey showed that people who expected war with Iraq were also more likely to expect a December earthquake.

SOURCES: Findings from the survey by the author's research group, reported in Farley et al., 1991a and 1991b; and from other surveys reported at a research conference held at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville in May 1991. These findings are summarized in Farley et al., 1991c. Many of these studies are reported in the November 1993 issue of the *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*.

object fads, such as Hula-Hoops, bumper stickers, pet rocks, and trolls; idea fads, such as the practice of astrology; activity fads, such as streaking and bungee jumping; and fads centered around personalities, such as Elvis and Vanna White.

PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Before we turn our attention to social movements, we need to discuss the role of collective behavior in society. Insights into the role collective behavior plays in society can be gained from both the functionalist and conflict perspectives.

The Functionalist Perspective

Functionalists point out that collective behavior does a number of things that are useful for society. Expressive crowds, for example, can promote social unity and solidarity (Turner and Killian, 1987), as in the case of sports celebrations that unite people in the local community or campus. When the St. Louis Cardinals made three appearances in the World Series during the 1980s, for example, local boosters cheered them on with the slogan “What a team! What a time! What a town, St. Louis!” A similar function occurs at the national level during events such as presidential inaugurations and Veterans Day parades. These celebrations “combat the tendency of the social order to degenerate into an uninspired enactment of daily routines without imagination or sense of purpose” (Turner and Killian, 1972, p. 423). Another important function of collective behavior is what has been called the “safety-valve function.” Collective behavior such as streaking, wild spring-break celebrations, and even rumors allows people to dissipate their tensions in a relatively harmless way. If not thus released, these tensions could lead to more serious consequences.

The Conflict Perspective

From a conflict perspective, collective behavior can work to advance the interests of various groups in society. Changes in fashion, for example, encourage people to buy more clothes, cosmetics, cars, and toys. Fads can serve a similar function, for those lucky enough to invent a fad product that catches on, such as the game Trivial Pursuit. More fundamentally, some conflict theorists argue that by focusing people’s attention on fun, fashion, and celebration, many forms of collective behavior distract people from real social

problems. Thus, they will not do anything to solve those problems that might threaten the interests of the wealthy. Consider again the St. Louis World Series celebrations. These took place in a city that, by any objective measure, had social problems rivaling those of any American city: widespread poverty, racial segregation and inequality, unemployment, crime, and teenage pregnancy. To solve these problems would involve a massive commitment of time, energy, and money. It might mean a redistribution of power, wealth, and income that would be to the disadvantage of the community’s elite. From their point of view, then, it was helpful to get people excited about the World Series so that they would not focus on the city’s real economic and social problems.

In a more extreme way, collective behavior can be a mechanism by which a group maintains its advantaged position in society. The clearest examples of this are the race riot and the lynch mob, in which members of an advantaged racial or ethnic group seek to maintain their position by attacking members of minority groups.

Collective Behavior and Disadvantaged Groups Collective behavior can also be used to advance the interests of disadvantaged groups. Much of the collective behavior of the 1960s and early 1970s—crowds, fashions, rumors, and entertainment—centered around widespread feelings that the system was unfair. This is illustrated by the popularity of blue jeans, symbolizing the rejection of high fashion in favor of traditional working-class attire. More dramatic forms of collective behavior, such as protests and riots, are also commonly used by dissatisfied groups to publicize their plight. In some instances, even violent protest achieves short-term results. Violent urban rebellions between 1964 and 1968 and again in 1992 clearly drew attention to the plight of American inner cities. In both periods, government programs and funding for the cities were passed following the violence. Survey research during the 1960s revealed that more blacks felt their situation had been helped than hurt by the riots (Campbell and Schuman, 1968). Most of the programs approved in the 1960s were short-lived, however, suffering cutbacks or elimination as soon as the violence died down. Twenty years later, most experts agreed that the conditions of urban ghettos were worse than before the rioting (Wilson, 1987), a situation that helped set the stage for renewed violence in 1992.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Up to now in this chapter, we have been addressing collective behavior, not social movements. The main difference between the two is that social movements are more orga-

nized and more purposeful than collective behavior. Collective behavior occurs spontaneously, but a social movement requires organization. Yet, as our earlier examples of collective behavior in protest crowds illustrate, collective behavior often occurs within contexts that are the outgrowth of social movements. Similarly, a social movement can be an outgrowth of collective behavior. This sometimes occurs when collective behavior occurs spontaneously on behalf of an idea. An example is the 1969 police raid on the Stonewall Bar, a gay nightclub in New York City's Greenwich Village (Altman, 1982, p. 113), that resulted in a spontaneous protest by homosexuals who felt that they were being unfairly persecuted simply because of their sexual orientation. This event is generally regarded as the beginning of the gay rights movement in the United States. This event alone did not make a social movement, however. Rather, by focusing attention on the problem, it led people to form organizations, which then adopted goals and organized a variety of activities to promote those goals. Once these organizations had been formed, the Stonewall event had been transformed from a spontaneous outbreak of protest activity into a social movement.

A **social movement**, then, can be defined as a large number of people acting together on behalf of some objective or idea. Usually, it involves the use of noninstitutionalized means, such as marches and protests, to support or oppose social change. Social movements involve substantial numbers of people and usually continue for an extended length of time (Blumer, 1974). Typically, a social movement will have an *ideology*—a set of beliefs and values that it seeks to promote. To a large extent, the success of a movement depends on its ability to convince potential participants, as well as the larger public, of the merits of its ideology (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988, pp. 724–725; Snow et al., 1986; Gerhards and Rucht, 1992).

Social movements are more common in industrialized countries than in preindustrial countries, and they are more common in relatively democratic societies than in authoritarian ones. With industrialization, interest groups become far more diverse, and social control weaker, which makes it easier for people to organize against conditions or ideas they oppose. Democracy has similar effects, whereas authoritarian regimes view social movements as a threat and use such techniques as surveillance and imprisonment to immobilize them before they can achieve a popular following. Industrialization makes this more difficult to do, however, and countries such as the former Soviet Union and Poland powerfully illustrate this. By 1991, the Solidarity movement, begun as a protest movement, had become the governing force in Poland. In 1991, the Soviet democracy movement, its hand greatly strengthened by successful resistance to the attempted coup against Gorbachev, brought an end to communism and ultimately to the Soviet

Union itself. As the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries democratized, a bewildering variety of ethnic, religious, and nationalist movements arose.

Types of Social Movements

There are five common types of social movements: protest movements, regressive movements, religious movements, communal movements, and personal cults. Although these are classified as different kinds of movements, they do overlap, and a particular movement may contain elements of more than one of the five types. Let us consider each in some detail.

Protest Movements *Protest movements* are movements whose objective is to change or oppose some current social condition. This is the most common type of social movement in most industrialized countries; examples in the United States are the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the gay rights movement, the anti-nuclear movement, the environmental movement, and the peace movement. Protest movements can be classified as reform movements or as revolutionary movements.

REFORM MOVEMENTS Most protest movements are *reform movements* aimed at achieving certain limited reforms, not remaking the entire society. They urge a new policy toward the environment, foreign affairs, or a particular racial or ethnic group. They do not urge the wholesale elimination or remaking of basic social institutions, such as the system of government or the economy.

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS Occasionally, however, protest movements take the form of *revolutionary movements*, which seek to remake an entire society through eliminating old institutions and establishing new ones. Revolutionary movements develop when a government repeatedly ignores or rejects the wishes of a large portion of its citizens or uses what people widely view as illegal means to suppress dissent. They can also form among a colonized racial or ethnic minority. Often a revolutionary movement develops after a series of related reform movements are unable to achieve the objectives they seek. Generally, revolutionary movements become successful only when a substantial share of the population comes to believe that their system of government cannot meet their basic needs. Although successful revolutions are rare, they do occur. Countries as diverse as the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China, Iran, Mexico, Zimbabwe, and the Philippines have this in common: In every one of these countries, the current system of government is directly or indirectly the product of a revolution at some time in the past.

Regressive Movements *Regressive movements* are social movements whose objective is to undo social change or to oppose a protest movement. An example of a regressive movement would be the anti-feminist movement, which opposes recent changes in the role and status of women and urges them to remain at home and take care of their children rather than seek outside employment. Other regressive movements include the Moral Majority, which opposed recent trends toward greater sexual freedom, and the Citizens' Councils, which have opposed school desegregation. More extreme forms of regressive movements include the Ku Klux Klan and various neo-Nazi groups, which believe in white supremacy and favor a return to strict racial segregation.

Sometimes a regressive movement forms directly in response to a protest movement. This type of regressive movement is called a *countermovement*. A current example is the anti-gay rights movement, which opposes legislation banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. In 1992, this movement succeeded in banning such anti-discrimination ordinances in Colorado, and in 1993 it opposed President Clinton's proposal to end the ban on homosexuals serving in the military. Almost any protest movement that becomes large and influential can generate a countermovement (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988, pp. 721–722). Countermovements develop among groups whose interests, values, or ways of life are challenged by the original protest movements. Once they have emerged, protest movements and their countermovements often engage in efforts to capture the support of public opinion (McAdam, 1983). An example of this can be seen in the efforts of opposing sides in the abortion debate to label themselves “pro-choice” and “pro-life” and to label their opponents as oppressors of women or killers of babies.

Religious Movements *Religious movements* can be defined as social movements relating to spiritual or supernatural issues, which oppose or propose alternatives to some aspect of the dominant religious or cultural order (see Lofland, 1985, p. 180; Zald and Ash, 1966; Zald and McCarthy, 1979). This broad category includes many sects, and even some relatively institutionalized churches that nonetheless oppose some element of the dominant religion or culture. Examples are the Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, and Mormons. This category includes movements that combine a religious message with political protest, such as the Nation of Islam (once popularly called the “Black Muslims”) in the United States and “liberation theology” among Latin American Catholics. Also included in the category of religious movements are the so-called cults, such as the Unification Church (Moonies), the Hare Krishnas, and the Scientologists, as well as movements within major religious organizations, such as the Pentecos-

tal movement within several Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church. Because these types of movement are discussed in Chapter 15, they will not be further explored here.

Communal Movements *Communal movements* attempt to bring about change through example by building a model society among a small group. They seek not to challenge conventional society directly, but rather to build alternatives to it. This is done in various ways. Some seek to create *household collectives*, popularly known as *communes*, in which people live together, share resources and work equally, and base their lives on principles of equality (Kanter, 1972, 1979). Others develop *work collectives*, in which people often live separately but jointly own, govern, and operate an organization that produces and sells some product (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). They prefer this approach to the hierarchy and inequality that characterize more typical work organizations.

Personal Cults A final type of movement, which usually occurs in combination with one of the others, is the *personal cult*. This kind of social movement centers around a person as much as around an idea, and that charismatic individual is revered by the people in the movement and elevated to a godlike status. Personal cults seem particularly common among religious and revolutionary political movements. We have already seen two examples of religious personal cults in our discussion of Jim Jones and his People's Temple, and David Koresh and the Branch Davidians. Another example of a personal cult is the cult centered around Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong in the 1960s.

The Branch Davidians were a personal cult led by David Koresh. The headquarters in Waco are shown burning after a confrontation with federal authorities.



THE CAUSES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Early Theories

Until fairly recently, sociologists often treated social movements as a form of collective behavior (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988; for examples of this approach see Blumer, 1946, 1955; Park, 1967; Park and Burgess, 1921). It was believed that, like collective behavior, mass movements developed when conditions were structurally conducive and spread through such means as contagion and convergence. Social movements were considered an outgrowth of people's psychological response to social conditions. Let us briefly examine some prominent early theories concerning the origins of social movements.

Personality and Mass-Society Theories The *personality theory* of social movements holds that people participate in movements to satisfy a personality need rather than to address a real grievance (Adorno et al., 1950; Carden, 1978; Feuer, 1969). This theory locates the cause of social movements, not in society, but in the individual, thus labeling movement participants as personally troubled. Similarly, *mass-society theory* (Arendt, 1951; Kornhauser, 1959; Selznick, 1952) holds that people often join social movements because they feel isolated and alienated in today's large-scale and often impersonal society.

One major flaw of both theories is that, according to most studies, movement participants are not very different from the rest of the population in terms of personality or psychological makeup. They are no more "alienated" than other people and are often drawn into these movements by friends and family (Drum, 1972; McAdam, 1986; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980). Moreover, assuming that human personalities are fairly constant, these theories do not explain why social-movement activities vary so much over time and among different societies.

Relative-Deprivation Theory *Relative-deprivation theory* holds that social movements emerge when people feel deprived or mistreated relative either to how others are treated or to how they feel they should be treated (Geschwender, 1964; Gurney and Tierney, 1982). Although this theory also refers to a psychological state or feeling, that state is clearly the product of certain kinds of social conditions. The important point here is that *absolute* deprivation does not cause social movements. In a country where everyone is poor, there is great absolute deprivation, but no relative deprivation. Nobody knows anything but poverty, so nobody feels unfairly treated (de Toqueville, 1955 [orig. 1856]).

In a society where wealth and poverty exist side by side, however, the poor are very conscious of their different situation and may well come to feel deprived. Similarly, when people are led to believe that their lot is going to improve and it does not, they are more likely to feel deprived. This is sometimes called the *revolution of rising expectations* (Davies, 1962). Social movements and revolutions often occur when conditions have improved *but then* either stop improving or don't improve as fast as people expect. This fact, along with the fact that more affluent societies have more social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988), provides some evidence in support of the relative-deprivation theory. It is hard to measure precisely how people *feel*, however, and studies that have correlated feelings of deprivation with participation in social movements have not generally revealed strong relationships (Mueller, 1980; Wilson and Orum, 1976). Thus, relative-deprivation theory can often predict *when* social movements are likely to emerge but cannot predict *who* is likely to participate.

Recent Theories

Since the 1960s, theories about the causes of social movements have become less psychological and more macro-structural. The relative-deprivation theory has remained influential, although some sociologists have reformulated it to emphasize its structural aspects rather than its psychological aspects. Smelser (1963), for example, emphasizes the notion of *structural strain*: conflicts or inequalities in society that are the source of feelings of dissatisfaction. This can include the types of social inequality that cause relative deprivation, but it can also include such things as gaps between what leaders preach and what they do. A prime example of the latter can be seen in the behavior of Soviet Communist Party officials, who talked about a government of workers but enjoyed luxuries no Soviet worker could get.

In addition, social conditions must be conducive to the formation of a social movement. People seeking to organize movements must have resources available to organize with, and people must see some usefulness in forming a social movement. Two newer theories of social movements, *resource-mobilization theory* and *political-process theory*, explore the social conditions under which these things happen.

Resource-Mobilization Theory *Resource-mobilization theory* argues that social movements emerge when people have access to resources that enable them to organize a movement. This theory assumes that some discontent is always present in a society, but that the resources necessary to form social movements are not always available

In South Africa, thousands of mourners take to the streets to mourn their assassinated leader Chris Hani. The notion of structural strain, or inequalities in society that cause dissatisfaction, certainly has value in analyzing the social protest movement in South Africa.



(McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977). Money, communication technology, and intellectual elites (from which leaders emerge) are all resources that can be used to organize a social movement (Zald and McCarthy, 1975). Because these resources are more available in a prosperous economy, growing prosperity is often associated with growing protest. How well a movement taps these resources also influences its chances of success. The black civil rights movement of the 1960s was able to gain strength, for example, by tapping significant resources offered by sympathetic whites, including money, legal representation, and direct participation. The mobilization of these resources did not *generate* the civil rights movement, but it did help to sustain and strengthen the movement once it had become large and influential (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984). One of the most important resources any movement can mobilize is interpersonal contacts (Macy, 1991). These contacts are the major source of new recruits, as well as of money and other kinds of assistance (Bolton, 1972; Snow et al., 1986; Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). Clearly, such activities as recruitment and fund raising are also facilitated by modern communication technology (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988, pp. 722–723). They are also helped by a concentration of like-minded people in the same place and by other situations, such as networks from organizations or past movements, that bring like-minded people into contact with one another (Freeman, 1973, 1979; D’Emillio, 1983; Lofland, 1985, Chapter 3; Morris, 1984, pp. 4–12; Wilson, 1973, pp. 140–151).

Political-Process Theory Closely related to resource-mobilization theory is **political-process theory**. This approach stresses opportunities for movements that are created by larger social and political processes (Tilly, 1978). The absence of repression that is associated with democratic societies, industrialization, and urbanization, for example, makes it easier for social movements to emerge. When people realize that the system is vulnerable to protest, movements are much more likely to develop (Jenkins and Perrow, 1978). People often make cost-benefit assessments of their potential participation in a social movement: Will the movement, or their participation in it, make any difference? One comparative study demonstrates how social movements are more likely to develop in the proper political environment (Nelkin and Pollack, 1981). It compared the development of the anti-nuclear power movement in Germany and France. The movement started similarly in both countries, but it grew and prospered in Germany, while it atrophied in France. The reason: The German governmental review procedures provided opportunities for intervention by those opposed to nuclear power plants; the French procedures did not.


Necessary Conditions for Social Movements

Taken together, these theories identify a number of important social conditions that must be present in order for a

PERSONAL JOURNEY INTO SOCIOLOGY

ON THE WAY TO REVOLUTION / Charles Tilly

At Harvard in the 1940s and 1950s, four remarkable teachers guided me to historical studies of conflict, collective action, state formation, and revolution. Pitirim Sorokin, veteran and victim of the Russian Revolution, was a hard taskmaster, but he showed his students the value of confronting large theories of social change with systematic evidence. Samuel Beer, a specialist in British politics, taught generations of undergraduates (not to mention the graduate assistants, myself among them, who worked in his famous lecture course on Western Thought and Institutions) how and why to confront political thought, social-scientific analysis, and major historical crises such as the English Revolution. George Homans combined sociology, history, and poetry in his own work, and he demonstrated the possibility of addressing pressing problems of sociological theory by means of analyses that would stand up to the scrutiny of professional historians. Barrington Moore, Jr., exemplified the restless, committed, independent scholar who undertakes large comparisons in order to seek answers to urgent contemporary questions such as the social foundations of tyranny. All four of them did me the enormous favor of letting me make my own mistakes and stumble toward my own



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definitions of the problems worth pursuing.

Over many years, those problems came to be these: How and why do large processes of structural change such as urbanization, industrialization, and the formation of national states occur, and what impact do they have on the lives of ordinary people? Under what conditions, and with what outcomes, do ordinary people act together on behalf of com-

mon interests? How do large structural changes alter the conditions for collective action? As a result of my own experiences and the influence of my teachers, I was skeptical from the beginning about prevailing functionalist theories, in which social order was normal, deviations from social order the result of system breakdowns and excessively rapid social change, and intense collective action a symptom of system overload. Much of my work has combated those theories and attempted to develop valid alternatives.

Early in my career, I approached these problems in two different ways: through studies of migration and population change in contemporary American cities such as Wilmington, Delaware, and through an examination of rural conflicts during the French Revolution. The two studies converged in a series of empirically based attacks on the common notion that rapid social change disorganizes people and therefore produces both individual disorders and collective protests. It took me a long time to work out positive alternatives to these negative ideas. Eventually I constructed a series of models of class formation, state formation, collective action, and relative social processes. In attempting to test these models and make them em-

social movement to emerge. First, as pointed out by the relative-deprivation and structural-strain approaches, people must be *dissatisfied*. Second, as the resource-mobilization approach emphasizes, people who are dissatisfied

must be able to *communicate with one another*. Third, as the political-process model suggests, the movement must be able to *survive any attempts at repression*, and it must be seen by *potential participants as having a reasonable chance for*

pirically workable, my collaborators (mostly advanced graduate students at the University of Toronto, the University of Michigan, and the New School for Social Research) and I developed methods for standardizing tangled historical evidence into comparable events, especially strikes, violent conflicts, and “contentious gatherings”: occasions on which a number of people gathered publicly and made claims bearing on someone else’s interests. Our painstaking definitions and procedures made it possible to create large computerized files of events such as our descriptions of about 6,000 contentious gatherings that occurred somewhere in Great Britain between 1828 and 1834, the period of the first successful popular mobilization for reform of Parliament and expansion of suffrage. This work involved me in organizing sizable research teams and inventing techniques for transcribing bulky, complicated historical material. A number of other researchers have since improved these methods in studying such subjects as ethnic conflicts in the United States, coffee growers’ politics in Brazil, and industrial conflicts in postwar Italy.

As my research groups worked on models and methods, the nation entered a period of intense social conflict over civil rights, the Vietnam War, educa-

tional reform, and other salient issues of the 1960s and 1970s. That wave of struggle undoubtedly helped inspire my effort and probably made its results more credible to students, other researchers, and the general public. On the whole, analyses of collective action were moving away from ideas of breakdown, disorder, and protest toward ideas of organized claim making. It is hard to know how much my work merely reflected the temper of the times and how much it actually made an independent difference to shared understanding of collective action. Some of each, no doubt.

In recent years, my collaborators and I have continued to analyze industrial conflict, violent encounters, and routine contention, but have also spent more and more time examining transformations of state power in the past and in the contemporary world. I am now, for example, trying to explain the rise of military power and of the military coup as a form of succession in the world’s poorer countries. All this work echoes a theme that has reverberated in my research and writing for 30 years: the relations, in both directions, between large structural changes and the experiences of ordinary people.

I have yielded to an ever-present temptation. Looking back on our complicated lives, most of

us feel an urge to make them tell coherent stories, as if they spelled out a plan that worked from the beginning. Someone else could easily make the same events tell a much more contingent story. When I was writing my book on the Vendée’s counterrevolution, for example, Harry Eckstein was starting a project on “internal war” at Princeton. Harry’s invitation to submit a fellowship proposal led me to lay out a research program on “urbanization and political upheaval” in France that now seems naive, but that started me on a series of studies I have never abandoned. What if no invitation to spend a year at Princeton had come along? I might easily have ended up much more heavily involved in the study of contemporary cities and urbanization, the other main topic on which I was working at the time. All I can honestly claim is that my great teachers taught me to watch for theoretical problems and research opportunities in which systematic evidence spread over considerable blocks of time and space could help narrow our uncertainty about the connections between large structural changes such as state formation, revolution, and urbanization, on the one hand, and alterations in the experiences—especially the collective experiences—of ordinary people, on the other.

success. This condition is a product both of its actual chances and of people’s sense of their ability to make a difference. Finally, the movement must have *adequate resources*, including leadership, money, and supporters, to

grow and develop. Any one of these by itself is not sufficient to generate a social movement, but when all of them occur together, the likelihood of a movement is greatly increased.

Movement Life Course: Civil Rights as a Case Study

Thus far, we have focused largely on social conditions that lead to the *emergence* of social movements. This is only the first in a series of stages that movements pass through over time (Blumer, 1969, 1974; Tilly, 1978; Zald and Ash, 1966). Social movements also go through a phase of *organization*, followed by *bureaucratization* or *institutionalization*. Finally, many movements sooner or later reach a period of *decline*. To illustrate this process, we shall use the civil rights movement as a case study.

Emergence Movements emerge when conditions are structurally conducive, as outlined above. An important part of movement emergence is having leaders who recognize that conditions are favorable for a movement, and who can successfully tap into people's dissatisfaction and desire to do something about the situation.

The origins of the civil rights movement illustrate this. By the 1950s, urbanization had heightened blacks' sense of relative deprivation, as had the experience of many African-American soldiers who fought for their country in World War II, only to return to a society that did not regard them as full citizens. The concentration of African Americans in urban ghettos facilitated communication and organization. A key event in the emergence of the civil rights movement occurred in 1955 in racially segregated Montgomery, Alabama, when a black woman named Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat to a white person. Though this act has commonly been portrayed as spontaneous, Parks had carefully thought out her plans and discussed them with church and civil rights leaders. Through Montgomery's black churches, a massive citywide bus boycott was organized to desegregate the buses; in a short time, thousands of supporters were mobilized. The boycott helped bring about a legal ruling forcing the bus system to desegregate; projected its leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to national prominence; and marked the beginning of the protest phase of the civil rights movement.

Organization During the *organization* phase, the emphasis is on mobilizing people, recruiting new participants, and attracting media attention. At this stage, events such as protest marches, picket lines, petition campaigns, boycotts, and efforts to pass legislation are common. Frequently, there are attempts to build coalitions with other groups with related or similar goals. Building a viable organization is crucial at this stage. A large-scale social movement requires both national and local organization (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988). The local organization in Montgomery was provided by a citywide boycott masterminded by black religious leaders under Dr. King's leader-

ship. At the national level, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) emerged, also under Dr. King's leadership, to coordinate activities in various locales.

In the organization stage, movement leaders must adapt their goals and tactics to the changing strategies of their opponents (Zald and Useem, 1987). When television images of police turning fire hoses on small children shocked the nation, civil rights activists were able to mobilize new support among Americans who had been angered by what they saw. When Dr. King was jailed, he used the resultant media attention as an opportunity to present his message to a wider audience.

As movements grow, new organizations using new tactics often appear. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), for example, emerged using the effective new tactic of sit-ins at segregated lunch counters. As diverse organizations evolved with different strategies, many of them cooperated in various ways, yet competed for supporters' acceptance. A high point of the organizational phase came in 1963, when 250,000 people marched on Washington and were inspired by Dr. King's famous "I have a dream" speech. (For more on the emergence and organization phases of the civil rights movement, see Morris, 1984; Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Killian, 1984; McAdam, 1982; Geshwender, 1964; Orum, 1972.)

Institutionalization When a social movement has reached the stage of *bureaucratization* or *institutionalization*, it has begun to cross the boundary from something "out of the ordinary" to an accepted part of the political, religious, or cultural patterns of society. Offices and bureaucratic structures are created to complete the tasks of the movement, and if the movement's goals are widely accepted in a society, the movement becomes an ordinary part of the society's social structure. By 1964, the influence of the civil rights movement had become sufficient to lead to the passage of major civil rights laws. The most important of these were the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. These laws, along with a series of Supreme Court rulings, effectively forbade virtually all forms of formal and deliberate racial discrimination and segregation. The courts and civil rights commissions took responsibility for enforcement, and a number of former civil rights leaders such as Andrew Young were elected or appointed to public office. The SCLC, NAACP, and other civil rights organizations became an accepted part of the political landscape, coming to be viewed more as political lobbies than as protest organizations.

These changes did not come easily. Before this stage could be reached, fierce opposition had to be overcome. A number of civil rights workers were killed, and on two occasions reluctant presidents sent federal troops to south-

ern states to enforce the law in the face of local defiance. President Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, when Governor Orval Faubus used the state's national guard to block integration of the city's high school. President Kennedy did the same in Mississippi after rioters attacked federal marshals sent to desegregate the University of Mississippi when Governor Ross Barnett refused to do so. Two people had been killed by the mob before the troops arrived. One hundred sixty of the marshals were injured, 28 by gunfire.

A risk for every movement is that once the movement reaches the institutionalization stage, it will become a part of the social structure that it originally opposed and take on some of the characteristics of this structure. In fact, it is a common tactic of institutions challenged by social movements to offer leaders of the movements positions within the institution they are challenging. In so doing, they give protest leaders "a stake in the system" and often succeed in getting them to moderate their criticisms. This process is called **cooptation**. For example, many corporations and governments have hired civil rights activists as community relations or human relations specialists, including in some cases people who had been among their critics.

Decline Eventually, a movement may *decline*. This may happen for a number of reasons: the loss of a charismatic leader, loss of support, or perhaps because the movement achieved its goals and did not succeed in developing new ones. Recent research by Frey, Deitz, and Kalof (1992) suggests that social movements more frequently fail because of factionalism than for any other reason. Although decline is listed last, it may occur at any point in the development of a social movement. Unless it is later reversed, it usually signals the end of a social movement. In a fair number of cases, however, the decline is eventually reversed, as

social conditions become conducive to a new round of movement activity.

In the 1970s, civil rights activity temporarily declined, probably for two main reasons. First, the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968 created the type of confusion and power vacuum that often follows the loss of a charismatic leader. Second, the movement had succeeded in removing the visible villains of segregation laws and police attacks on nonviolent demonstrators. Now the villain was an abstract set of processes, not well understood and not even recognized by most whites (Kluegel and Smith, 1982, 1986; Schuman, 1975), that continued to keep blacks disproportionately poor and unemployed. From a recruitment standpoint, blacks saw less point in getting involved, because their previous successes had made so little difference in their everyday lives.

By the mid-1980s, however, the civil rights movement enjoyed a resurgence of support, which has continued into the 1990s. This resurgence was galvanized by the presidential candidacies in 1984 and 1988 of the Reverend Jesse Jackson; by racist attacks such as a 1987 Ku Klux Klan attack on civil rights marchers in Forsythe County, Georgia; and by growing resentment of the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations, which opposed affirmative action and gave urban problems a low priority. Thousands came out to vote for Jackson and other black candidates; 20,000 Americans from nearly every state marched on Forsythe County just a week after the Klan incident; and by 1992, a movement at the University of North Carolina demanding a black cultural center drew the biggest protest crowds since the Vietnam War.

The latter incident also marks another notable trend — the resurgence of college student activism. In this chapter's "Social Issues for the '90s" box, we examine the extent of this trend and the issues that have given rise to it.

The Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery, Alabama, gives tribute to those who lost their lives in the movement over the years. Although the civil rights movement seemed in decline in the 1970s, by the mid-1980s there was a resurgence of support, which has continued into the 1990s.



STUDENT ACTIVISM, '90s STYLE

Following a decade of campus apathy, it looks as though the 1990s are becoming a decade of renewed student activism. Nearly thirty years after the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, students are *relearning the old* techniques of sit-ins, teach-ins, barricades, walkouts, protests, and demonstrations. A new era of activism appears to have arrived, but the issues now are very different.

Can one draw a parallel between present student activism and 1960s protests?

In what ways do students in the 1990s differ from their 1960s counterparts?

What are the main issues triggering students' protests?

Are students successful in their demands?

The 1990 Gulf War was an early trigger to this decade's campus protests, and there were similarities to the great anti-war movement of the 1960s. Rallies and teach-ins brought out hundreds of students at UC Santa Barbara, UC Berkeley, the University of Michigan, Stanford, and the University of Minnesota. In mid-October 1990, there were anti-war demonstrations in 20 cities. Hundreds of students from the University of Montana marched through the streets of downtown Missoula, chanting "Hell, no, we won't go, we won't fight for Texaco." It looked as though a big student movement was gathering steam.

Though many college students supported the Gulf War once it was under way, student activism has not abated; rather, it has changed targets. Not surprisingly, considering the national focus on economic problems, a number of student protests, like the one described earlier in this chapter, center on tuition increases and college budget cuts. But protest issues run the gamut from racism to date rape to environmental problems, labor conflicts, and gay rights.

More than 10,000 students at dozens of campuses participated in walkouts, sit-ins, and protest marches during the 1989 Los Angeles teachers' strike—most of them supporting the teachers' demands—the largest wave of student-led protests in the schools in 20 years. In 1990, a wave of protests and demonstrations swept across high

schools and colleges across the country. The issues: firing of principals, allegations of racism against a school board, teacher layoffs, budget cuts, even dress codes. In response to a 1990 UCLA survey involving almost 300,000 students at 587 campuses, 37 percent of freshmen said they had participated in organized demonstrations. That number contrasts with 21 percent in 1983. Alexander Astin, a professor of higher education and the director of the Higher Education Institute at UCLA, who has conducted the survey since 1966, acknowledges the rapidly growing opposition force, but doesn't liken it to the movements of the 1960s. There is no single issue like the Vietnam War, but rather a multitude of issues: racism, sexism, AIDS, contraception, the environment, and the quality of education. Also, students seem to be rebelling against the 1980s' obsession with financial success.

For nearly two weeks, in October 1990, students occupied the administration building of the University of the District of Columbia, threatening to keep the school closed until they got what they wanted: the resignations of certain members of the school board, child care for students with children—in all, 45 demands. In other words, they were demanding a better education. (Forty-two of their demands were agreed to before the university reopened.)

In April 1991, students took over buildings at City College and City University of New York as a protest against tuition increases and budget cuts, and similar protests occurred at several schools in 1992. That year, San Diego State University witnessed the largest demonstrations since the Vietnam War in response to proposed budget cuts, most of which were later rescinded.

Although many demonstrations involve racism on campus, apartheid in South Africa, and various environmental issues, concerns about educational quality are on the rise. A number of organizations have been founded to address that issue; for example, United Student Leaders for Quality Education (Northern Virginia Community College) and Undergraduates for a Better Education (Syracuse University). As a result of student demands, several colleges—including Syracuse University, UCLA, Pennsylvania State University, and Purdue University—have instituted training programs and proficiency standards for teaching assistants from foreign countries, to make sure they communicate well in English. Some universities have put students on academic boards and committees to satisfy students' demands.

Another wave of protests disrupted classes in the Los Angeles Unified School District in September 1992, as high school students vented their anger over cuts in education spending. Students were worried about classroom overcrowding; the lack of desks and books; and the pressure on their teachers, who were threatened by huge salary cuts.

In February 1993, students at the State University of New York took over the campus library to protest the layoffs

SOURCES: *New York Magazine*, March 8, 1993; *The New York Times Magazine*, March 7, 1993; *The New York Times*, February 24, 1993; *The Los Angeles Times*, September 10, 1992; *The New York Times*, April 10, 1991; *The Los Angeles Times*, December 23, 1990; *The New York Times*, November 4, 1990; *The New York Times*, October 17, 1990; *The Los Angeles Times*, March 7, 1990.

of five professors and the elimination of a performing arts program that emphasized African-American music and dance. The 20-hour takeover ended after the university president agreed to two of the students' three demands.

Protests continued throughout the 1993 school year. At Harvard's graduation in June, hundreds of students protested the opposition of the commencement speaker, General Colin Powell, to President Clinton's proposal to lift the ban on gays in the military. The campus where I teach, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, was rocked the same week by protests by students, faculty, and staff over actions taken against two students who had failed to "pre-register" an earlier demonstration in support of union workers. These protests led to numerous press conferences, heated public arguments, and rallies, one of which was the largest in two decades.

In spite of 1990s students' pragmatism, campuses are dominated by two ideological issues: racism and sexism. Student organizations such as "Ethos for Equality" sponsor discussions of racism and sexism on campus. The topic of date rape is the source of intense protests and demonstrations on major campuses. In February 1992, Columbia University joined dozens of other colleges across the country by establishing a rape-crisis center. "Take Back the Night," a feminist group that has chapters in most colleges, conducts annual marches and all-night speak-outs. In a guerrilla technique pioneered at Brown University, women scrawl on campus walls the names of male students accused of rape. The sexual assault/date rape movement has been successful in attracting media attention and even changing the law: In July 1992, the Campus Sexual Assault Victims' Bill of Rights became federal law. Under that law, sexual assault victims have the right to call in off-campus authorities to investigate campus sex crimes. Like Brown, many campuses now offer self-defense classes and sexual assault workshops.

The latest issue to raise students' anger would seem very square to 1960s radicals: It's the federal deficit. "Lead . . . or Leave," a Washington-based group founded by two graduate students who believe the young are being cheated by generational politics and the impending Social Security bankruptcy, is commanding a lot of attention on campuses. Students worry about the tax burden they will have to shoulder to pay for the various deficits that have been mushrooming since the 1970s.



TERRORISM

Occasionally, either social movements or their opponents turn to **terrorism**: the use of violence, usually against civilian targets, as a means of intimidation through fear. Terror-

ism can be committed either by clandestine organizations or by governments, or by the two in cooperation. Clandestine organizations that commit terrorism are usually associated with *insurgent groups*, militant and highly ideological protest groups that are generally, but not always, revolutionary in nature. Significantly, these groups tend to be made up of—or at least led by—relatively well-educated rebels, not the very poor (Radu, 1987, p. 300). Usually, they are acting on behalf of an ideology, and they tend to be both "true believers" and "ideological purists" who see their own views as "correct" and see those who disagree with them as being "in need of education." In many cases, terrorist groups form among ethnic separatists or nationalists who seek to create their own state apart from the larger society in which they live. Examples of separatist or nationalist movements that have led to terrorism are French-speaking separatists in Quebec, Canada; Basque separatists in Spain; and Palestinians seeking to create a homeland in the Middle East.

In some cases, such as the Ku Klux Klan and various neo-Nazi and skinhead organizations in the United States, countermovement groups also use tactics of terrorism. In fact, groups of this type have probably been the most important source of terrorist actions within the United States (Oakley, 1986, p. 22). In contrast to insurgent groups, members of these groups tend to be poor and relatively uneducated, although their leaders might have somewhat higher levels of education. A recent example of countermovement terrorism in the United States is the 1993 murder by an anti-abortion activist of Dr. David Gunn, a physician who performed abortions at a Florida clinic.

Terrorist groups tend to be limited in the types of violence in which they engage. The most common forms of terrorism by insurgent groups are bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hostage taking, and hijackings (Jenkins, 1982). Countermovement groups engage in assassinations, kidnappings, and lynchings.

Governments and Terrorism

Terrorism is also committed by *governments*. Most often government terrorism takes the form of countermovement terrorism: an attempt to intimidate its opponents or critics. Obviously, government terrorism is most common in authoritarian and totalitarian governments (see Chapter 12). The most common kinds of terrorism by governments are political executions, death squads, torture, imprisonment without trial, and military attacks against civilian targets. In El Salvador, for example, 37,000 political murders were documented by human rights organizations affiliated with the Archdiocese of San Salvador during the period from 1979 to 1984 (Neier, 1985). These murders were committed by government security forces and by paramilitary organizations working with them.

IS ONE PERSON'S "TERRORIST" ANOTHER PERSON'S "FREEDOM FIGHTER"?

An important issue in any discussion of terrorism is the question of who gets labeled a terrorist. As Brian Jenkins (1980, p. 1) points out, *terrorist* is generally a pejorative term that you apply to your opponents while applying a different label, such as *freedom fighters*, to your allies: "If one party can successfully attach the label *terrorist* to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do."

Thus, to the Israelis, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a terrorist organization, killing innocent women and children on behalf of its goal of eliminating Israel. Attacks on PLO camps by Israel are seen as entirely justifiable retributions for that terrorism. Yet from the Palestinian view, the PLO consists of freedom fighters seeking the return of land illegally taken by the

Israelis. Palestinians argue that Israeli "retributions" take the lives of innocent women and children in refugee camps, not of those who carry out the attacks. Moreover, far more lives are lost in these attacks than in any of the PLO attacks. Thus, from the Palestinian view, the Israelis were the terrorists, and from the Israeli view, the Palestinians were the terrorists.

Jenkins (1980, p. 2) argues, however, that in reality the distinction between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" is clear: Attacks on civilian rather than military targets, carried out for political motives, are terrorist acts no matter who commits them. Attacks against strictly military targets may be classified as freedom fighting. Even war has its rules, such as not killing or harming civilian prisoners. According to Jenkins, freedom fighting usually

follows these rules; terrorism does not. By his criteria, he counts both the PLO attacks and the Israeli reprisals as terrorism (Jenkins, 1980, p. 5). Similarly, the Nicaraguan Contras, who were labeled "freedom fighters" by Ronald Reagan, also engaged in terrorism, in the form of assassinations of public officials and violence against villagers sympathetic to the Sandinista government. In another case, the United States went even further when it labeled as "freedom fighters" a group that by Jenkins's definition would have to be considered terrorists: In an ironic twist, it proposed in 1984 to make payments to the Salvadoran army to "fight terrorism"—just months after units of that army had massacred 80 unarmed civilians near the town of Los Llanitos (Treisman, 1985).

Governments can also assist insurgent groups in other countries (as, for example, Iran has in Lebanon), but they do not usually engage directly in insurgent terrorism. Governments also engage in terrorism when they attempt to intimidate their military opponents by bombing entirely civilian targets. Significantly, this rarely has the intended effect. For example, Germany's saturation bombing of London appears only to have intensified British resolve and hatred of the Nazis; much the same appears to have been true in the case of Allied saturation bombing of German cities such as Dresden (U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947).

A final point is that the word *terrorism* is an emotionally charged term. For this reason, both governments and advocacy groups tend to characterize their opponents as "terrorists" and their supporters as "freedom fighters." The validity of this distinction is discussed in the box entitled "Is One Person's 'Terrorist' Another Person's 'Freedom Fighter'?"

Terrorism in the Modern World

Although terrorism has a long history, it has become more common and deadly since about 1970. Not only has the number of terrorist incidents risen dramatically, but they are increasingly directed against people rather than property. In the 1980s, about half of all terrorist attacks were directed against people, far more than in the early 1970s. Moreover, the number of attacks indiscriminately aimed at innocent bystanders, such as large bombs in cars and airport lockers, has increased (Jenkins, 1987), for several reasons. First, today's international economy requires world travel and world trade on a massive scale. This makes it virtually impossible to screen out every potential terrorist. Second, the development of modern mass media gives terrorists a way to get attention and instill fear—much of what they do is done for the benefit of the television cameras. The effectiveness of terrorism in instilling fear can be seen by the massive drop in U.S. tourism to Europe during the



The number of terrorist attacks indiscriminately aimed at innocent bystanders, such as the bombing of the World Trade Center, has increased.

summer of 1986. This occurred after terrorist attacks on U.S. military personnel in Europe and retaliatory raids on Libya, which was suspected of backing the attacks. Finally, the relative openness of today's industrial democracies makes them especially vulnerable to terrorism. You cannot prevent people from committing terrorism without curtailing personal freedom. For example, we now accept personal searches as part of the cost of making air travel safer.

In spite of all this, terrorism must be kept in perspective. At least four out of five terrorist incidents involve no deaths (Jenkins, 1987, p. 353), and the number of incidents that result in many deaths is surprisingly small. Between 1900 and 1985, only seven incidents involved 100 or more deaths, and only a dozen or so more involved 50 to 99 deaths (Jenkins, 1987, p. 353). The consequences of terrorism have been substantial in two regards, however. First, many public officials have been killed by political assassins, including the prime ministers or presidents of India, Sweden, Egypt, and Pakistan, in just the past decade. Thus, an individual or a small group of terrorists can and often does overrule established law in the choice of government leaders. Second, terrorism invokes fear, which does influence people's behavior.

Who Is Vulnerable to Insurgent Terrorism?

In general, the countries that have been most vulnerable to insurgent terrorism are those that are either relatively democratic (Western Europe) or that lack effective central governments (Lebanon). Countries that routinely have a large number of foreign visitors are particularly vulnerable to international terrorism. This analysis helps to explain the relative lack of terrorism within the United States. Despite a few dramatic cases such as the 1993 World Trade Center

bombing, there have been relatively few acts of insurgent terrorism in the United States. The United States has been the target of many terrorist acts, but most of them have occurred elsewhere, mainly Europe and the Middle East (Jenkins, 1982). The United States is relatively isolated, sharing borders with only two foreign countries. European countries have far more foreign visitors relative to their population, and thus are more frequently infiltrated by international terrorists.

The countries that have been most free of insurgent terrorism have been authoritarian and totalitarian countries that systematically and effectively repress dissent. In countries where individual rights are disregarded, terrorism is more easily detected and suppressed. As authoritarian regimes such as the former Soviet Union have broken down, terrorism has increased. In a sense, it could be said that the risk of terrorism is one of the prices of freedom.

Can Terrorism Be Combated?

Can anything be done about terrorism? Briefly, the answer is yes, but at a cost. Effective dictatorships do not usually have problems with terrorism, as we already noted. But a free government, unwilling to engage in terrorism itself, probably cannot entirely prevent terrorism. Arresting terrorists reduces the incidence of terrorism (Laqueur, 1987). This is particularly true if arrests come swiftly as they did after the World Trade Center bombing. Yet, if only some of the terrorists are arrested, the result may be reprisals by their collaborators. Acts of retaliation against terrorists may convince them that the costs of their actions are too great, as may well have happened when the United States made raids against Libya's Ghadafi in reprisal for his support of anti-American terrorists. Still, reprisals can lead to new incidents of terrorism, as is illustrated by the cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians. Experts do agree on one thing: It is clearly unwise to threaten acts of reprisal and then fail to carry them out (Whitaker, 1985).

There is an expert consensus on two other points. First, the opportunities for terrorism should be decreased, by instituting better security at airports and potential targets such as embassies, and by improving intelligence gathering (Whitaker, 1985). Second, although negotiations with terrorists are essential in many cases, it is unwise to give in to their demands because this only gives them an incentive to commit more terrorism. However, when government leaders are genuinely concerned about freeing hostages, the temptation to make concessions to terrorists can be great, as even President Reagan came to discover when he sold arms to Iran in an effort to free American hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon.

Although terrorism can be reduced, the reality is that in democratic societies operating in a worldwide economy, it cannot be eliminated entirely.

SUMMARY

Collective behavior occurs when large numbers of people act together in extraordinary situations, where usual norms do not apply. It can take place in either crowds or masses; in both cases, the temporary norms of the collectivity permit or encourage behavior that would not normally occur. Collective behavior emerges when the situation is structurally conducive—in other words, the situation generates feelings of fear, anger, happiness, excitement, sorrow, or some other strong emotion. But even when the situation is conducive, collective behavior does not occur until some precipitating incident triggers it.

The main kinds of crowd behavior are panics, mobs, riots, protest crowds, expressive crowds, and public grief. Obviously, different kinds of conditions generate these various types of collective behavior. A most extreme type of crowd behavior, fortunately very rare, is mass suicide. This behavior illustrates the extent to which the collectivity's norms can replace society's usual norms when conditions are conducive.

The main forms of mass behavior are rumors, urban legends, mass hysteria, fads, and fashions. As with crowd behavior, these different forms of mass behavior reflect different predominant emotions and are generated under different social conditions. Here, too, a precipitating incident, such as a radio broadcast of a rumor, can often trigger widespread collective behavior—but, again, only when the conditions are otherwise conducive.

A phenomenon related to, but different from, collective behavior is social movements. Social movements can trigger or use events of collective behavior, such as protest crowds or riots. However, movements are more planned and goal-oriented than collective behavior. In addition,

they require sustained and often complex organization. Collective behavior does not; in fact, it is typically characterized by a *lack* of such organization.

The main kinds of social movements are protest movements (which may seek either reform or revolutionary change), regressive movements (including countermovements), religious movements, communal movements, and personal cults. Movements tend to develop when people experience relative deprivation, when they have the necessary resources to organize themselves, and when the situation creates opportunities to alter the conditions that led to dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction, the ability of dissatisfied people to communicate, and a belief that “something can be done” are all critical to the emergence of a social movement. In order to grow, a movement must avoid or survive attempts at repression. Often, unsuccessful attempts at repression become an important organizing tool, as was the case with the African-American civil rights movement.

Occasionally, either movements or countermovements (including governments) may turn to terrorism: violence against civilians aimed at intimidation. Although terrorism has been around for centuries, it has been increasing in recent decades. The most serious form of terrorism in terms of loss of life is government terrorism against its own citizens. Other forms take relatively few lives, but they have had significant effects in terms of changing people's routines and creating fear. They have also led to the loss of a number of important world leaders through assassination. Short of creating dictatorships that lead to government terrorism, insurgent terrorism probably cannot be entirely prevented, although certain actions can be taken to reduce its impact and frequency.

GLOSSARY

collective behavior Large numbers of people acting together in an extraordinary situation, in which usual norms governing behavior do not apply.

crowd A large number of people who are localized in one place and whose interaction is only temporary.

mass A large number of people who are physically separated yet interact and are subject to common social influences.

structural conduciveness A condition in which the social situation is favorable for the emergence of a particular behavior, such as collective behavior or a social movement.

precipitating incident An event, often dramatic, unexpected, or highly publicized, that acts as a trigger for collective behavior under conditions of structural conduciveness.

contagion A process through which a proposed or mod-

eled action is rapidly adopted or imitated by a crowd or mass.

convergence A dynamic in which a crowd acts as one because many people in the crowd share emotions, goals, or beliefs.

emergent norms A process whereby a crowd collectively and interactively develops its own norms about how to behave.

civil disobedience Nonviolent protest actions that violate the law.

mob An extremely emotional acting crowd that directs its violence against a specific target.

riot An outbreak of violent crowd behavior, aimed against people, property, or both, that is not focused on one specific target.

panic An acting crowd that is suddenly swept by fear and responds with spontaneous and often self-destructive behavior.

rumor An unconfirmed item of information spread by word of mouth and sometimes by unconfirmed media reports.

urban legend An unsubstantiated story containing a plot, which is widely circulated and believed.

mass hysteria A behavior in which people dispersed over a sizable geographic area perceive and respond to a threat, either real or imagined.

fashion A style of appearance or behavior that is favored by a large number of people for a limited amount of time.

fad An amusing mass involvement or activity, usually somewhat unconventional, that is temporary in nature.

social movement A large number of people acting together on behalf of a shared objective or idea, usually using noninstitutional means.

relative-deprivation theory A theory holding that social movements emerge when people feel deprived or mistreated relative to others, or relative to what they feel they should be receiving.

resource-mobilization theory A theory arguing that social movements grow when they are able to obtain and use available resources successfully.

political-process theory A theory arguing that social movements arise in response to opportunities created by political and social processes, such as modernization, democratization, and economic growth.

cooptation A process whereby leaders of social movements are led to adopt more moderate positions by being given positions of status or authority in institutions.

terrorism The use of violence, usually against civilian targets, as a means of intimidation or social control.

FURTHER READING

BRUNVAND, JAN HAROLD. 1984. *The Choking Doberman and Other "New" Urban Legends*. New York: W. W. Norton. You'll have so much fun reading this book that you may not realize you are learning something important about sociology in the process. Brunvand spins the latest yarns and then proceeds to show that they aren't as new as we think. He also analyzes why they spread and why people believe them.

GITLIN, TODD. 1987. *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. New York: Bantam. This book was written by a sociologist, but for a wider audience than just sociology students and teachers. Gitlin describes and analyzes the social movements and collective behaviors of the 1960s, combining his perspectives as a sociology professor today and as a nationally recognized leader in the movements of the 1960s when he was in college.

HALL, JOHN R. 1987. *Gone from the Promised Land: Jonestown in American Cultural History*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Hall's analysis of the causes of the Jonestown tragedy is a fine example of the use of the sociological imagination. Hall bases his analysis on a combination of content analysis of original documents concerning the tragedy, reviews of what others have written, and interviews with people with firsthand experience of the People's Temple. Hall shows how the People's Temple used organizational practices that are totally commonplace in American life to bring about a most uncommon and disastrous result.

LUKER, KRISTIN. 1984. *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood*. Los Angeles: University of California Press. A case study of an issue that illustrates the interaction between movement and counter-movement. Luker also examines the very different social characteristics that lead people to become involved in the "pro-choice" and "pro-life" movements, offering important insights into their social meaning.

MARULLO, SAM, AND JOHN LOFLAND (ED). 1990. *Peace Action in the Eighties: Social Science Perspectives*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. An analysis of the 1980s peace movement from

four perspectives: the stages through which it evolved; the structures of the organizations it contained; the major types of campaigns undertaken along with their success or failure; and the varied characteristics of its participants.

MORRIS, ALDON. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: Free Press. Like Charles Tilly's vignette in this chapter, Morris shows how responses by people to the oppressive situations they encounter give rise to social movements—in this case, the black civil rights movement in the United States.

SMELSER, NEIL J. 1963. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press. This is a classic that offers a model of collective behavior that is still valid in the 1990s. Smelser's "value-added" approach is a good starting point for analyzing a variety of types of collective behavior.

TARROW, SIDNEY. 1989. *Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. A paperback that provides a comprehensive assessment of new social movements and the latest research by scholars of social movements. Includes an explanation of how social movements can affect and be affected by politics and political organizations.

TURNER, RALPH H., AND LEWIS M. KILLIAN. 1987. *Collective Behavior*, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. An up-to-date, comprehensive discussion of both collective behavior and social movements by two widely recognized sociologists. It includes over 60 items by a variety of authors, presenting information on actual cases of collective behavior and social movements.

WHALEN, JACK, AND RICHARD FLACKS. 1989. *Beyond the Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows Up*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. An interesting account of the lives of political activists involved in 1960s and 1970s protest movements and how that participation subsequently affected their lives.